CVE-2018-3756 in Iroha
Summary
by MITRE
Hyperledger Iroha versions v1.0_beta and v1.0.0_beta-1 are vulnerable to transaction and block signature verification bypass in the transaction and block validator allowing a single node to sign a transaction and/or block multiple times, each with a random nonce, and have other validating nodes accept them as separate valid signatures.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/19/2023
Hyperledger Iroha version v1.0_beta and v1.0.0_beta-1 contain a critical vulnerability in their cryptographic signature verification mechanism that fundamentally undermines the security model of the distributed ledger system. This vulnerability resides in the transaction and block validator components where the system fails to properly validate that each signature corresponds to a unique nonce value. The flaw allows an attacker controlling a single node to generate multiple signatures for the same transaction or block, each with different random nonce values, and have the network accept these as legitimate separate signatures. This represents a severe deviation from expected cryptographic security practices where signature validation should enforce uniqueness and prevent replay attacks.
The technical implementation flaw stems from insufficient validation of signature nonces within the consensus mechanism. In proper cryptographic systems, each signature should be tied to a unique nonce value that prevents replay attacks and ensures that duplicate signatures cannot be accepted as valid. The vulnerability manifests when the validator accepts multiple signatures for the same transaction or block without verifying that the nonce values are unique, effectively allowing a single malicious node to bypass the intended signature verification process. This issue aligns with CWE-327, which addresses the use of weak cryptographic algorithms and improper implementation of cryptographic functions, and specifically relates to the failure to implement proper nonce validation in signature verification.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound as it enables a single compromised node to manipulate the consensus process and potentially alter transaction histories or block contents. An attacker could exploit this to create conflicting transactions or blocks that appear valid to other network participants, leading to potential double-spending scenarios or data integrity violations. The vulnerability undermines the fundamental trust model of Iroha's distributed consensus, where multiple nodes validate transactions and blocks to ensure network integrity. This weakness creates a scenario where the network's security depends on the honesty of all nodes, but a single malicious node can effectively bypass this requirement by exploiting the signature verification bypass.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate patching of affected Iroha versions to implement proper nonce validation in the signature verification process. Organizations should ensure all nodes in the network are upgraded to patched versions that enforce unique nonce values for each signature within a transaction or block. Network administrators must also implement monitoring systems to detect unusual signature patterns or nodes attempting to submit multiple signatures with identical content but different nonces. The fix should align with established security practices such as those outlined in the NIST SP 800-57 standard for cryptographic key management and the MITRE ATT&CK framework's defense evasion techniques, particularly those related to signature spoofing and credential manipulation. Additionally, implementing proper audit trails and signature validation logging can help detect exploitation attempts and provide forensic evidence for security investigations.