CVE-2019-1003095 in Perfecto Mobile Plugin
Summary
by MITRE
Jenkins Perfecto Mobile Plugin stores credentials unencrypted in its global configuration file on the Jenkins master where they can be viewed by users with access to the master file system.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/25/2023
The Jenkins Perfecto Mobile Plugin vulnerability represents a critical security flaw in how sensitive authentication data is handled within the Jenkins continuous integration platform. This vulnerability specifically affects the plugin's storage mechanism for credentials used to authenticate with Perfecto Mobile testing services, creating an exploitable weakness that can lead to unauthorized access to testing environments and associated resources. The flaw resides in the plugin's configuration file management approach, where authentication tokens and credentials are persisted in plain text format rather than being properly encrypted or obfuscated. This design decision fundamentally undermines the security posture of Jenkins installations that utilize this plugin, as it creates a persistent attack surface where malicious actors with file system access can directly extract sensitive information without requiring additional authentication vectors.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from the plugin's failure to implement proper credential encryption mechanisms during the configuration storage process. When administrators configure the Perfecto Mobile plugin with their authentication credentials, these details are written directly to the Jenkins master's file system in an unencrypted format within the global configuration file. This approach violates fundamental security principles for credential storage and aligns with CWE-312, which specifically addresses the exposure of sensitive information through improper data handling. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it operates at the file system level, meaning that any user with sufficient privileges to read the Jenkins master configuration files can immediately access the stored credentials without requiring complex exploitation techniques or additional attack vectors. The lack of encryption or obfuscation in the storage mechanism creates a direct path for credential compromise that can be exploited by both internal and external threat actors with appropriate access rights.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential theft, as it can enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to Perfecto Mobile testing environments and potentially compromise the entire testing pipeline. Once attackers obtain the stored credentials, they can perform actions such as executing automated tests, accessing test results, manipulating test configurations, and potentially gaining access to sensitive data processed through the Perfecto Mobile platform. This vulnerability can also facilitate more sophisticated attacks, including privilege escalation within the Jenkins environment, as attackers may use the compromised credentials to access additional systems or services that rely on the same authentication mechanisms. The impact is particularly severe in enterprise environments where Jenkins masters may contain multiple plugins and configurations, creating a potential escalation path that could lead to broader system compromise. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to techniques involving credential access and privilege escalation, as it provides attackers with legitimate authentication credentials that can be used to move laterally within the environment.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on immediate remediation actions and long-term architectural improvements to prevent similar issues in the future. The most effective immediate solution involves upgrading to a patched version of the Jenkins Perfecto Mobile Plugin where proper credential encryption mechanisms have been implemented. Administrators should also implement strict file system access controls and privilege management to limit who can read the Jenkins master configuration files. Additional mitigations include regular security auditing of plugin configurations, implementing monitoring for unauthorized file access attempts, and considering alternative authentication methods such as Jenkins credentials binding or external secret management systems. Organizations should also review their overall credential management practices and implement principles of least privilege for all Jenkins components, ensuring that only authorized personnel have access to sensitive configuration files. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the importance of secure coding practices and proper credential handling mechanisms, particularly in environments where multiple plugins and services interact with sensitive authentication data.