CVE-2019-19802 in Command Centre Server
Summary
by MITRE
In Gallagher Command Centre Server v8.10 prior to v8.10.1134(MR4), v8.00 prior to v8.00.1161(MR5), v7.90 prior to v7.90.991(MR5), v7.80 prior to v7.80.960(MR2) and v7.70 or earlier, an authenticated user connecting to OPCUA can view all data that would be replicated in a multi-server setup without privilege checks being applied.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/17/2020
This vulnerability exists in Gallagher Command Centre Server versions prior to specific patch releases across multiple major versions including v8.10.1134, v8.00.1161, v7.90.991, v7.80.960, and earlier. The flaw specifically affects the OPC UA (Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture) protocol implementation within the server software, creating a critical access control weakness that allows authenticated users to bypass normal privilege checks. The vulnerability stems from insufficient authorization validation mechanisms within the OPC UA interface, enabling malicious actors with valid credentials to access data that should only be available to administrators or systems with specific replication privileges. This represents a significant escalation of privileges issue where standard user accounts can potentially view sensitive operational data that would normally be restricted to privileged system components in multi-server configurations. The vulnerability directly impacts the principle of least privilege and could allow unauthorized data exposure in environments where the server operates as part of a distributed security infrastructure.
The technical flaw manifests through improper access control implementation in the OPC UA service layer where the system fails to validate whether an authenticated user possesses adequate privileges to access specific data sets that would typically be replicated across multiple servers. This occurs because the OPC UA interface does not properly enforce role-based access controls or privilege checks that would normally be in place to restrict data access based on user permissions. Attackers can leverage this weakness by establishing a legitimate OPC UA connection and then attempting to access data objects that contain information about replicated server configurations, security settings, or operational parameters that should remain restricted. The vulnerability essentially creates a backdoor path through which authenticated users can access data that would normally be protected by the server's replication security mechanisms, potentially exposing sensitive operational information that could aid in further attacks against the system or network.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exposure, as it could enable attackers to gather intelligence about the security infrastructure and operational configurations of the Gallagher Command Centre environment. In multi-server setups, this vulnerability allows attackers to potentially understand the replication topology, identify critical systems that handle sensitive data, and map out the security architecture of the connected environment. The exposure of replication data could reveal information about server roles, data synchronization patterns, and operational dependencies that could be exploited in subsequent attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in security-critical environments where the Gallagher Command Centre Server manages access control systems, surveillance infrastructure, or other sensitive operational data. The ability to view replicated data without proper authorization checks could lead to information disclosure that might enable attackers to craft more sophisticated attacks against the broader security ecosystem, potentially compromising physical security systems or access control infrastructure that relies on the Command Centre Server for operation.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should immediately implement the vendor-provided patches for their specific version of the Gallagher Command Centre Server, with particular attention to upgrading to the minimum recommended versions that contain the access control fixes. Network segmentation should be implemented to restrict access to OPC UA interfaces, and strict authentication controls should be enforced for all systems that require OPC UA connectivity. Security monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual OPC UA connection patterns or unauthorized data access attempts, particularly when users access replication-related data objects. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and could be leveraged in accordance with ATT&CK technique T1078 (Valid Accounts) and T1566 (Phishing). Regular security assessments should be conducted to ensure that access controls are properly configured and that no additional privilege escalation paths exist within the OPC UA implementation. Additionally, administrators should review and restrict user permissions to minimize the potential impact if similar vulnerabilities are discovered in the future, implementing the principle of least privilege for all accounts with access to OPC UA interfaces.