A cleartext transmission vulnerability exists in the network communication functionality of WAGO e!Cockpit version 1.5.1.1. An attacker with access to network traffic can easily intercept, interpret, and manipulate data coming from, or destined for e!Cockpit. This includes passwords, configurations, and binaries being transferred to endpoints.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/13/2024
The cleartext transmission vulnerability in WAGO eCockpit fails to implement proper transport layer security, leaving all network communications susceptible to interception and manipulation by malicious actors who can access the network traffic. The vulnerability specifically impacts the network communication functionality of the industrial automation platform, which is designed to manage and configure industrial devices and systems.
The technical implementation of this flaw stems from the absence of encrypted communication channels within the eCockpit management interface and connected endpoints, all data is transmitted in plain text format without any form of encryption or authentication. This includes sensitive credentials such as passwords, configuration parameters, and binary firmware updates that are essential for industrial system operations. The vulnerability creates a pathway for attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks, where intercepted data can be easily read, modified, or replayed without any cryptographic barriers to prevent such activities. Network sniffing tools can readily capture and decode the transmitted information, making this a particularly dangerous weakness in industrial environments where system integrity is paramount.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exposure to encompass potential system compromise and operational disruption within industrial control environments. Attackers who can intercept the cleartext communications can gain unauthorized access to system configurations, extract sensitive authentication credentials, and potentially manipulate firmware updates to introduce malicious code into industrial endpoints. This threat vector aligns with ATT&CK technique T1071.004 for application layer protocol and T1566 for credential harvesting through network traffic interception. The consequences could range from unauthorized system access and configuration changes to more severe impacts such as operational disruption or even physical system compromise in environments where industrial control systems are connected to operational technology networks.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including network segmentation to isolate eCockpit interfaces, while ensuring that all network communications are properly encrypted and authenticated. The incident highlights the necessity of following security standards such as NIST SP 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27001 for protecting industrial control systems from network-based attacks. Organizations must also prioritize updating to patched versions of e!Cockpit software when available and conduct thorough security assessments of their industrial network infrastructure to identify similar vulnerabilities in other industrial control system components.