CVE-2020-24008 in Umanni RH
Summary
by MITRE
Umanni RH 1.0 has a user enumeration vulnerability. This issue occurs during password recovery, where a difference in messages could allow an attacker to determine if the user is valid or not, enabling a brute force attack with valid users.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2020
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2020-24008 affects Umanni RH 1.0, a web application that provides user authentication and password recovery functionality. This issue represents a classic user enumeration flaw that significantly weakens the system's security posture by exposing user account information through subtle differences in system responses. The vulnerability specifically manifests during the password recovery process, where the application's response behavior differs between valid and invalid user accounts, creating a clear signal for attackers to distinguish between existing and non-existing accounts. This type of information disclosure vulnerability directly violates security principles that require systems to provide consistent responses regardless of input validity to prevent attackers from gathering intelligence about system internals.
The technical flaw stems from improper error handling within the password recovery mechanism where the application returns different response messages or behaviors when a user attempts to recover a password for an account that exists versus one that does not exist. When a valid user account is targeted, the system might return a success message indicating that a recovery email has been sent, while for invalid accounts, it might return an error message stating that no account was found. This differential response pattern creates a user enumeration vector that allows threat actors to systematically test usernames by observing response variations. The vulnerability is categorized under CWE-200, which addresses "Information Exposure," and more specifically aligns with CWE-640, "Weak Password Recovery Mechanism," as it enables attackers to bypass normal authentication barriers through the recovery process. The flaw operates at the application layer and can be exploited through automated tools that rapidly iterate through potential usernames, making it particularly dangerous for systems with large user bases or those that do not implement account lockout mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant as it enables credential stuffing attacks and brute force attempts with minimal effort and high success probability. Attackers can leverage the enumeration capability to identify valid user accounts within the system, which then becomes a foundation for more sophisticated attacks including password spraying, credential reuse, and targeted social engineering campaigns. The vulnerability creates a pathway for unauthorized access that bypasses traditional authentication controls, potentially leading to full system compromise if the compromised accounts have elevated privileges. This issue also contributes to the broader category of account takeover attacks and aligns with tactics described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under T1110, "Brute Force," and T1566, "Phishing," as it provides attackers with the initial foothold needed for these attack vectors. The impact is particularly severe in environments where user accounts may have access to sensitive data, financial systems, or critical infrastructure components, as the enumeration process can be automated and scaled to target large user populations.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2020-24008 should focus on implementing consistent error handling throughout the password recovery process to eliminate information disclosure. Organizations should ensure that all password recovery requests return identical responses regardless of whether the user account exists, preventing attackers from distinguishing between valid and invalid accounts through response analysis. This involves modifying the application logic to use generic messages such as "If an account exists with this email, a recovery message has been sent" for all requests. Additionally, implementing rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms can prevent automated enumeration attempts from succeeding, while logging and monitoring systems should be configured to detect and alert on unusual patterns of password recovery requests. The fix should also include implementing proper session management and ensuring that the recovery process does not provide any additional information about the account state beyond what is necessary for legitimate users to complete the recovery process. Security testing should include penetration testing focused on identifying similar information disclosure vulnerabilities in authentication flows, and the system should be regularly updated to address this and related vulnerabilities in the application framework.