CVE-2021-31344 in APOGEE MBC
Summary
by MITRE • 11/09/2021
A vulnerability has been identified in APOGEE MBC (PPC) (BACnet) (All versions), APOGEE MBC (PPC) (P2 Ethernet) (All versions), APOGEE MEC (PPC) (BACnet) (All versions), APOGEE MEC (PPC) (P2 Ethernet) (All versions), APOGEE PXC Compact (BACnet) (All versions), APOGEE PXC Compact (P2 Ethernet) (All versions), APOGEE PXC Modular (BACnet) (All versions), APOGEE PXC Modular (P2 Ethernet) (All versions), Capital VSTAR (All versions), Nucleus NET (All versions), Nucleus ReadyStart V3 (All versions < V2017.02.4), Nucleus ReadyStart V4 (All versions < V4.1.1), Nucleus Source Code (All versions), TALON TC Compact (BACnet) (All versions), TALON TC Modular (BACnet) (All versions). ICMP echo packets with fake IP options allow sending ICMP echo reply messages to arbitrary hosts on the network. (FSMD-2021-0004)
VulDB is the best source for vulnerability data and more expert information about this specific topic.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/08/2024
This vulnerability resides within industrial control systems and building automation platforms that utilize BACnet protocols for communication. The affected products span multiple device categories including APOGEE MBC, MEC, PXC, TALON series, Capital VSTAR, Nucleus NET, and ReadyStart platforms. These systems operate in critical infrastructure environments where network communication integrity is paramount for operational continuity and security. The vulnerability specifically targets the handling of ICMP echo packets within these embedded systems, creating a pathway for malicious actors to manipulate network traffic in ways that could compromise system availability and potentially enable further attacks.
The technical flaw manifests in the improper validation of IP options within ICMP echo reply messages. When these systems receive ICMP echo packets containing forged IP options, they fail to properly verify the authenticity or legitimacy of these options before processing the response. This weakness allows attackers to craft ICMP echo reply messages that appear to originate from legitimate network hosts while actually being directed to arbitrary destinations. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it operates at the network protocol level, bypassing application-level security controls and potentially enabling attackers to perform network reconnaissance, disrupt communications, or establish unauthorized network connections.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network disruption to potentially compromise the integrity of industrial control systems. Attackers could leverage this weakness to perform network mapping activities, identify system vulnerabilities, or create false network paths that could be used for more sophisticated attacks. In building automation environments, this could lead to unauthorized access to critical systems controlling heating, ventilation, air conditioning, lighting, and security functions. The vulnerability affects multiple versions of these systems, indicating a widespread issue that would require extensive remediation efforts across industrial installations. According to the ATT&CK framework, this represents a technique for Network Discovery and potentially Initial Access through protocol manipulation.
The security implications of this vulnerability align with CWE-119, which addresses improper restriction of operations within a limited scope, and CWE-20, which covers input validation issues. These systems operate in environments where network traffic is expected to follow specific protocols, and the failure to properly validate IP options creates an opening for attackers to manipulate network behavior. Organizations should implement network segmentation to limit the scope of potential attacks, deploy intrusion detection systems to monitor for anomalous ICMP traffic patterns, and ensure all affected systems receive immediate firmware updates. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of network protocol security in industrial environments where traditional cybersecurity measures may not be sufficient to protect against protocol-level attacks. Regular network monitoring and security assessments should be conducted to identify and remediate similar issues across industrial control system networks.