CVE-2021-44518 in 3rd Generation Travel Padlock App
Summary
by MITRE • 12/02/2021
An issue was discovered in the eGeeTouch 3rd Generation Travel Padlock application for Android. The lock sends a pairing code before each operation (lock or unlock) activated via the companion app. The code is sent unencrypted, allowing any attacker with the same app (either Android or iOS) to add the lock and take complete control. For successful exploitation, the attacker must be able to touch the lock's power button, and must be able to capture BLE network communication.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/08/2021
The vulnerability identified in CVE-2021-44518 affects the eGeeTouch 3rd Generation Travel Padlock application for Android devices, representing a critical security flaw in the device's pairing mechanism. This issue stems from the application's failure to implement proper encryption for the pairing code transmission, creating an exploitable weakness that allows unauthorized individuals to gain complete control over the lock. The security vulnerability manifests in the application's design where it sends pairing codes in plaintext format before each lock or unlock operation, fundamentally undermining the device's security architecture and leaving it susceptible to various forms of attack.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication protocol used by the padlock to establish connections with companion mobile applications. The pairing code is transmitted without any form of encryption or authentication, making it susceptible to interception and manipulation by malicious actors. This flaw specifically targets the pre-authentication phase of the device interaction process, where the system expects users to manually interact with the lock's physical power button to initiate pairing. The requirement for physical proximity and the ability to capture BLE network traffic creates a specific attack vector that aligns with the attack pattern described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1046 technique for network service scanning and T1566 for credential access through social engineering.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability demonstrates a fundamental failure in implementing proper cryptographic controls during the initial device pairing process. The absence of encryption for the pairing code violates industry standards such as those outlined in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and ISO/IEC 27001, which mandate the protection of sensitive data during transmission. The flaw represents a classic example of a man-in-the-middle attack scenario where an attacker can intercept the unencrypted pairing code and subsequently register the lock with their own device, gaining complete control over the lock's operational functions. This vulnerability directly maps to CWE-312, which addresses the exposure of sensitive information through improper encryption or lack of encryption in data transmission.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access, as it enables full compromise of the padlock's security ecosystem. Once an attacker successfully intercepts and utilizes the pairing code, they can perform any operation on the lock including locking and unlocking, potentially enabling theft of valuable items or unauthorized access to secure areas. The requirement for physical access to the lock's power button creates a specific threat model where attackers must be in close proximity to the device, but this limitation does not prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability through network monitoring and interception techniques. This weakness creates a significant risk for users who may not be aware of the security implications of their device's communication protocols, particularly in environments where BLE traffic can be easily monitored.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate security concerns and the underlying architectural flaws in the application's design. Organizations and individuals should implement network monitoring solutions to detect unauthorized pairing attempts and establish secure communication protocols that encrypt all pairing codes and authentication data. The recommended approach includes implementing proper encryption standards such as TLS or AES encryption for all communication channels between the mobile application and the padlock device. Additionally, the device manufacturer should consider implementing additional authentication mechanisms including challenge-response protocols and time-based one-time passwords to prevent unauthorized pairing attempts. The implementation of these mitigations aligns with the principle of least privilege and defense in depth as outlined in the CWE guidelines and helps address the specific weaknesses identified in the vulnerability's attack surface. Users should also be educated about the importance of physical security and the risks associated with leaving devices in environments where BLE traffic can be easily intercepted.