CVE-2022-0878 in Combined Charging System (Brokenwire)
Summary
by MITRE • 04/12/2022
Electric Vehicle (EV) commonly utilises the Combined Charging System (CCS) for DC rapid charging. To exchange important messages such as the State of Charge (SoC) with the Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) CCS uses a high-bandwidth IP link provided by the HomePlug Green PHY (HPGP) power-line communication (PLC) technology. The attack interrupts necessary control communication between the vehicle and charger, causing charging sessions to abort. The attack can be conducted wirelessly from a distance using electromagnetic interference, allowing individual vehicles or entire fleets to be disrupted simultaneously. In addition, the attack can be mounted with off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical knowledge. With a power budget of 1 W, the attack is successful from around 47 m distance. The exploited behavior is a required part of the HomePlug Green PHY, DIN 70121 & ISO 15118 standards and all known implementations exhibit it. In addition to electric cars, Brokenwire affects electric ships, airplanes and heavy duty vehicles utilising these standards.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/17/2022
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2022-0878 represents a critical security flaw in the Combined Charging System (CCS) infrastructure used for electric vehicle charging operations. This weakness specifically targets the HomePlug Green PHY (HPGP) power-line communication technology that serves as the high-bandwidth IP link for exchanging crucial control messages between electric vehicles and charging equipment. The flaw exists within the fundamental protocols defined by DIN 70121 and ISO 15118 standards, making it pervasive across all known implementations of the charging ecosystem. The vulnerability manifests as a susceptibility to electromagnetic interference attacks that can disrupt the essential communication channels required for proper charging session management and state information exchange between vehicle and charger components. This represents a significant concern for the growing electric mobility infrastructure where reliable communication between vehicles and charging stations is paramount for safe and efficient operations.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability leverages the inherent characteristics of power-line communication systems that operate within the HomePlug Green PHY standard, which is specifically designed to transmit data over electrical power lines. Attackers can execute successful disruptions using off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical expertise, making this threat particularly dangerous as it lowers the barrier to entry for malicious actors. The attack mechanism operates wirelessly from distances of approximately 47 meters with only a 1 watt power budget, demonstrating the practical feasibility of large-scale disruption attacks. This capability allows for targeted attacks against individual vehicles or coordinated disruptions affecting entire vehicle fleets simultaneously, creating substantial operational risks for transportation companies, charging network operators, and infrastructure providers. The attack specifically interrupts control communication necessary for maintaining charging sessions, causing them to abort unexpectedly and potentially leaving vehicles stranded during critical charging operations.
The operational impact of CVE-2022-0878 extends far beyond simple charging interruptions, affecting the entire electric vehicle ecosystem including automotive manufacturers, charging infrastructure providers, and fleet operators. The vulnerability compromises the integrity of communication channels that are essential for proper vehicle charging session management, potentially leading to service disruption, customer dissatisfaction, and safety concerns. Given that the affected systems are part of the required implementation standards, all known implementations are vulnerable, creating a widespread threat landscape that affects not only passenger vehicles but also commercial electric ships, aircraft, and heavy-duty vehicles utilizing these same charging protocols. This vulnerability directly impacts the reliability and security posture of electric mobility infrastructure, potentially causing cascading failures in charging networks and undermining confidence in electric vehicle adoption. The attack's ability to be executed with minimal technical knowledge and off-the-shelf equipment creates a persistent threat that could be exploited by various threat actors including nation-state actors, criminal organizations, or disgruntled individuals.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-310 and CWE-311 categories related to cryptographic weaknesses and information exposure, though it specifically manifests as a communication disruption rather than traditional data compromise. The attack pattern corresponds to ATT&CK technique T1498 which involves network denial of service attacks, and potentially T1566 for social engineering through physical manipulation of charging infrastructure. Mitigation strategies must address both the hardware and protocol levels, requiring implementation of robust electromagnetic interference protection measures, enhanced communication redundancy protocols, and potentially hardware-level filtering mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disruption of power-line communication channels. Network segmentation approaches and monitoring systems that can detect abnormal communication patterns or session termination events should be deployed to identify and respond to potential attacks. Organizations utilizing these charging systems should implement comprehensive security assessments of their power-line communication infrastructure and consider upgrading to more secure communication protocols that are resistant to electromagnetic interference attacks. The vulnerability highlights the need for security by design principles in critical infrastructure systems and underscores the importance of considering physical layer security threats in addition to traditional cybersecurity measures.