CVE-2022-26476 in Spectrum Power 4
Summary
by MITRE • 06/14/2022
A vulnerability has been identified in Spectrum Power 4 (All versions using Shared HIS), Spectrum Power 7 (All versions using Shared HIS), Spectrum Power MGMS (All versions using Shared HIS). An unauthenticated attacker could log into the component Shared HIS used in Spectrum Power systems by using an account with default credentials. A successful exploitation could allow the attacker to access the component Shared HIS with administrative privileges.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/15/2022
This vulnerability affects critical industrial control systems manufactured by Spectrum Power, specifically targeting components that utilize the Shared HIS (Historian Information System) architecture. The flaw represents a fundamental security weakness that undermines the integrity of industrial automation environments where these systems operate. The vulnerability exists within the authentication mechanism of the Shared HIS component, which is integral to data collection and historical logging functions in power generation and management systems. The affected products include Spectrum Power 4, Spectrum Power 7, and Spectrum Power MGMS across all their versions that implement the Shared HIS framework, indicating this is a widespread issue affecting multiple generations of industrial control equipment.
The technical nature of this vulnerability stems from the implementation of default credentials within the Shared HIS component, which remains accessible to unauthorized users without proper authentication. This represents a classic security misconfiguration issue that falls under CWE-798, specifically related to the use of hard-coded credentials in software. The vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to gain administrative access to the Shared HIS component simply by exploiting these default account credentials, bypassing all normal authentication procedures. This weakness creates a backdoor access point that provides full administrative privileges within the targeted system, enabling attackers to manipulate historical data, access sensitive operational information, and potentially disrupt system operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe for industrial environments that rely on Spectrum Power systems for critical infrastructure management. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can gain complete control over the historian component, which typically stores crucial operational data, historical trends, and system performance metrics. This access could enable adversaries to manipulate historical records, potentially leading to false data reporting that could mislead operators and analysts. The administrative privileges gained through this exploit could also allow attackers to modify system configurations, access restricted operational parameters, or even interfere with the normal functioning of the power management systems. From an attack framework perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004, which covers legitimate credentials for privilege escalation and lateral movement within industrial control systems.
The implications extend beyond immediate system compromise as the Shared HIS component often serves as a repository for critical operational data that feeds into decision-making processes for power generation and distribution. This vulnerability creates a potential pathway for attackers to compromise the integrity of historical operational data, which could be used to mask malicious activities or create false baselines for system performance. Organizations using these Spectrum Power systems face significant risk of operational disruption, data integrity compromise, and potential safety hazards if attackers exploit this vulnerability to manipulate system parameters or historical records. The default credential issue represents a particularly dangerous flaw because it often goes unnoticed during security assessments and system deployments, as administrators may not be aware of these hardcoded credentials or may not properly secure them. The vulnerability's existence highlights the critical importance of proper credential management and the need for robust security practices in industrial control environments, particularly when dealing with systems that have direct implications for public safety and infrastructure reliability.