CVE-2022-3752 in CompactLogix
Summary
by MITRE • 12/20/2022
An unauthorized user could use a specially crafted sequence of Ethernet/IP messages, combined with heavy traffic loading to cause a denial-of-service condition in Rockwell Automation Logix controllers resulting in a major non-recoverable fault. If the target device becomes unavailable, a user would have to clear the fault and redownload the user project file to bring the device back online and continue normal operation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/02/2023
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2022-3752 represents a critical denial-of-service weakness in Rockwell Automation Logix controllers that can be exploited through carefully constructed Ethernet/IP message sequences. This flaw specifically targets industrial control systems where operational technology infrastructure relies on reliable controller performance for continuous manufacturing processes. The vulnerability operates within the Ethernet/IP protocol implementation of these industrial controllers, creating a pathway for malicious actors to disrupt critical operations through network-based attacks.
The technical mechanism behind this vulnerability involves the manipulation of Ethernet/IP message handling within the Logix controller firmware. When subjected to a specific sequence of crafted messages combined with high network traffic loads, the controller's processing capabilities become overwhelmed, leading to a state where the device enters a non-recoverable fault condition. This behavior stems from insufficient input validation and inadequate resource management within the controller's Ethernet/IP stack implementation, allowing malformed or specially constructed packets to trigger unexpected system behavior that ultimately results in complete service disruption.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network disruption to encompass complete production halts and significant downtime for industrial facilities. When a Rockwell Automation Logix controller enters a non-recoverable fault state, the entire industrial process relying on that controller becomes compromised, potentially affecting assembly lines, manufacturing equipment, and automated production workflows. The recovery process requires manual intervention including fault clearing procedures and complete project file re-downloading, which can take considerable time and may result in production losses measured in hours or days depending on the facility's size and complexity.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-400 which addresses "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption" and represents a classic example of resource exhaustion through protocol manipulation. The attack vector specifically maps to ATT&CK technique T1499.004 which covers "Endpoint Denial of Service" through resource consumption, demonstrating how industrial control systems can be targeted using network-based approaches that leverage protocol implementation weaknesses. Organizations implementing these controllers face significant risk exposure, particularly in environments where continuous operation is critical and any downtime can result in substantial financial losses or safety hazards.
Mitigation strategies should focus on network segmentation and access control measures to limit exposure to potentially malicious traffic sources. Implementing network monitoring and anomaly detection systems can help identify unusual traffic patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. Regular firmware updates from Rockwell Automation should be prioritized as the primary defense mechanism, while network administrators should consider implementing rate limiting and message filtering rules specific to Ethernet/IP traffic. Additionally, organizations should develop and maintain comprehensive incident response procedures specifically addressing industrial control system failures to minimize recovery time and operational impact when such vulnerabilities are exploited.