CVE-2022-41382 in d8s-json
Summary
by MITRE • 10/12/2022
The d8s-json package for Python, as distributed on PyPI, included a potential code-execution backdoor inserted by a third party. The backdoor is the democritus-file-system package. The affected version is 0.1.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 05/20/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2022-41382 represents a sophisticated supply chain attack targeting the Python package ecosystem through the PyPI repository. This incident demonstrates how malicious actors can compromise software distribution channels by injecting backdoors into widely-used packages, creating a significant risk for developers and organizations that rely on third-party dependencies. The attack specifically targeted the d8s-json package version 0.1.0, which was distributed through the Python Package Index, a trusted repository that developers routinely use to acquire libraries for their projects.
The technical flaw manifests through the inclusion of a malicious dependency named democritus-file-system within the compromised d8s-json package. This backdoor operates by exploiting the normal package installation process where developers install dependencies without thoroughly examining the complete dependency tree. When users install the compromised package, the democritus-file-system module is automatically downloaded and executed, potentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected systems. The vulnerability represents a classic case of malicious code injection where the legitimate package appears to function normally while harboring hidden malicious functionality.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond individual system compromises to potentially affect entire development ecosystems and production environments. Organizations that unknowingly install the compromised package may experience unauthorized code execution, data exfiltration, or further system infiltration. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it leverages the trust developers place in established package repositories and the automated dependency resolution processes that are standard in modern Python development workflows. Security teams may not immediately detect the compromise since the malicious behavior could be subtle or occur only under specific conditions.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate action including removal of the compromised package from all affected systems, updating security monitoring processes to detect anomalous package installations, and implementing more rigorous dependency verification procedures. Organizations should establish dependency integrity checks using tools like pip-audit or similar package verification systems that can identify known malicious packages. The incident highlights the importance of implementing software supply chain security measures and adheres to CWE-494 principles regarding the risks of downloading and executing unverified code. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to techniques involving supply chain compromise and malicious code injection, emphasizing the need for comprehensive security controls throughout the software development lifecycle.
The broader implications of this vulnerability underscore the critical need for enhanced security practices in open source software ecosystems, including regular security audits of dependencies, implementation of software bill of materials tracking, and establishment of secure software development practices. This incident serves as a reminder that even trusted repositories can be compromised and that developers must maintain vigilance in monitoring their dependency trees and implementing robust security controls to protect against such sophisticated attacks.