CVE-2022-4492 in Communications Cloud Native Core Policy
Summary
by MITRE • 02/23/2023
The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This is a compulsory step (at least it should be performed by default) in https and in http/2. I would add it to any TLS client protocol.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/05/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2022-4492 represents a critical security flaw in the undertow client implementation that fundamentally undermines the integrity of secure HTTPS communications. This issue manifests as a failure to validate server identity during TLS handshakes, specifically when establishing https connections. The vulnerability directly violates established cryptographic security principles and represents a significant deviation from standard TLS client behavior that should be mandatory across all secure communication implementations.
The technical flaw stems from the undertow client's omission of server certificate validation during the TLS handshake process. This validation step is essential for ensuring that the client is communicating with the intended server and not an imposter or man-in-the-middle attacker. When server identity checking is disabled or bypassed, attackers can perform successful man-in-the-middle attacks by presenting fraudulent certificates that appear legitimate to the client. The vulnerability affects both https and http/2 protocols, demonstrating the widespread nature of the implementation flaw across modern secure communication standards. This represents a direct violation of the TLS protocol specification requirements and industry best practices.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and far-reaching across organizations utilizing undertow clients for secure communications. Attackers can exploit this weakness to intercept sensitive data, modify communications, or redirect traffic to malicious endpoints without detection. The vulnerability essentially renders the TLS encryption layer ineffective from the client perspective, as the authentication mechanism that should prevent impersonation attacks is completely bypassed. This creates an environment where all data transmitted over https connections becomes vulnerable to interception and manipulation, potentially exposing confidential information, credentials, and business-critical data. The impact extends beyond individual applications to affect entire enterprise communication infrastructures that rely on undertow client implementations.
Organizations should immediately implement mitigations including updating to patched versions of undertow that enforce proper server identity validation, configuring explicit certificate validation policies, and implementing additional monitoring to detect potential man-in-the-middle attacks. Security teams must also review their existing certificate management practices and ensure that all client implementations enforce strict server certificate validation. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-295, which specifically addresses "Improper Certificate Validation," and represents a critical weakness in the TLS security model that directly enables attacks categorized under the MITM attack pattern in the ATT&CK framework. Organizations should also consider implementing certificate pinning mechanisms as an additional defense-in-depth measure while awaiting full remediation of the underlying vulnerability.