CVE-2023-32995 in SAML Single Sign On Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 05/16/2023
A cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Jenkins SAML Single Sign On(SSO) Plugin 2.0.0 and earlier allows attackers to send an HTTP POST request with JSON body containing attacker-specified content, to miniOrange's API for sending emails.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/26/2025
This cross-site request forgery vulnerability exists within the Jenkins SAML Single Sign On plugin version 2.0.0 and earlier, representing a critical security flaw that undermines the integrity of the authentication system. The vulnerability stems from the plugin's improper handling of CSRF protection mechanisms when processing HTTP POST requests to miniOrange's external API endpoints. Attackers can exploit this weakness by crafting malicious requests that appear to originate from legitimate authenticated users, thereby bypassing the expected security controls designed to prevent unauthorized actions. The flaw specifically manifests when the plugin processes JSON payloads containing attacker-specified content, which are then forwarded to miniOrange's email sending API without adequate validation or anti-CSRF token verification.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability allows attackers to manipulate the SAML authentication flow by leveraging the trust relationship between Jenkins and miniOrange's services. When a user with appropriate privileges interacts with the Jenkins interface, the malicious request can be constructed to automatically submit data to miniOrange's API endpoint, potentially enabling unauthorized email notifications or other actions that the attacker controls. This represents a classic CSRF attack vector where the attacker leverages the victim's authenticated session to perform actions on their behalf without their knowledge or consent. The vulnerability's impact is amplified by the fact that it operates at the authentication layer, potentially allowing attackers to escalate privileges or gain unauthorized access to sensitive information through the compromised email delivery mechanisms.
The operational implications of this vulnerability extend beyond simple unauthorized email sending, as it could enable attackers to perform more sophisticated attacks within the Jenkins environment. Security practitioners should note that this flaw creates a potential pathway for privilege escalation attacks, where unauthorized individuals might manipulate the SAML authentication process to gain elevated access rights. The vulnerability affects organizations that rely on SAML-based authentication for their Jenkins instances, particularly those using the miniOrange plugin for identity management. According to CWE-352, this represents a standard Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability where the application fails to verify the origin of requests, making it susceptible to unauthorized operations. The attack surface is particularly concerning as it combines identity management with external API interactions, creating multiple potential exploitation points.
Organizations should immediately implement mitigations including updating to the patched version of the Jenkins SAML SSO plugin, ensuring proper CSRF token validation is enforced, and implementing additional security controls around external API communications. Network segmentation and monitoring of API calls to miniOrange services should be enhanced to detect anomalous patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this vulnerability under T1566 - Phishing and T1078 - Valid Accounts, as it leverages legitimate authentication flows to execute unauthorized actions. Administrators should also consider implementing web application firewalls and request validation mechanisms to prevent unauthorized POST requests from reaching the vulnerable plugin endpoints. Regular security assessments of authentication plugins and their external dependencies are essential to prevent similar vulnerabilities from emerging in the future, particularly as organizations increasingly rely on integrated identity management solutions that introduce additional attack vectors through third-party service integrations.