CVE-2023-40585 in ironic-image
Summary
by MITRE • 08/26/2023
ironic-image is a container image to run OpenStack Ironic as part of Metal³. Prior to version capm3-v1.4.3, if Ironic is not deployed with TLS and it does not have API and Conductor split into separate services, access to the API is not protected by any authentication. Ironic API is also listening in host network. In case the node is not behind a firewall, the API could be accessed by anyone via network without authentication. By default, Ironic API in Metal3 is protected by TLS and basic authentication, so this vulnerability requires operator to configure API without TLS for it to be vulnerable. TLS and authentication however should not be coupled as they are in versions prior to capm3-v1.4.3. A patch exists in versions capm3-v1.4.3 and newer. Some workarounds are available. Either configure TLS for Ironic API (`deploy.sh -t ...`, `IRONIC_TLS_SETUP=true`) or split Ironic API and Conductor via configuration change (old implementation, not recommended). With both workarounds, services are configured with httpd front-end, which has proper authentication configuration in place.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/20/2023
The vulnerability described in CVE-2023-40585 affects the ironic-image container used in OpenStack Ironic deployments within Metal³ environments. This represents a critical authentication bypass flaw that undermines the security posture of cloud infrastructure deployments relying on unsecured Ironic APIs. The issue manifests when operators configure Ironic without proper transport layer security and fail to separate API and conductor services into distinct components. This configuration creates an attack surface where unauthorized network actors can access Ironic's API directly through the host network interface without any form of authentication, potentially compromising the entire bare metal provisioning infrastructure. The vulnerability directly relates to CWE-306, which addresses missing authentication mechanisms, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1078.004 for valid accounts and T1566.001 for spearphishing via email, as unauthorized access could enable attackers to manipulate bare metal provisioning workflows.
The technical flaw stems from the improper coupling of transport layer security and authentication mechanisms within versions prior to capm3-v1.4.3. Specifically, the Ironic API service listens directly on the host network interface without requiring authentication when TLS is not enabled, creating a fundamental security gap where network exposure equals administrative access. This design flaw violates security best practices by not implementing proper separation of concerns between network security and application-level authentication. The vulnerability requires specific misconfiguration to be exploitable, namely the absence of TLS encryption and lack of service separation, but once present, provides unrestricted access to the Ironic API. The host network listening behavior means that any network traffic reaching the host can potentially access the unauthenticated API, making it particularly dangerous in environments without proper network segmentation or firewalls.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to encompass complete compromise of bare metal provisioning capabilities. Attackers could manipulate Ironic's provisioning workflows, potentially leading to unauthorized node deployment, configuration changes, or even complete system compromise through malicious image injection. The vulnerability affects Metal³ deployments where Ironic is used for bare metal infrastructure management, creating risks for organizations relying on automated provisioning systems. This issue particularly impacts cloud infrastructure operators who may have deployed Ironic without proper security hardening, especially in development or testing environments where security configurations are often relaxed. The consequences include potential data breaches, service disruption, and unauthorized access to critical infrastructure components that manage physical hardware resources.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2023-40585 focus on implementing proper security controls through configuration changes in newer versions of capm3. The recommended approach involves enabling TLS encryption for Ironic API communications through the deploy.sh script with the -t parameter or by setting IRONIC_TLS_SETUP=true environment variable. Additionally, operators should implement proper service separation by configuring Ironic API and conductor services as distinct components rather than running them together in a single process. These workarounds ensure that authentication mechanisms are properly enforced through the httpd front-end component, which includes appropriate authentication configuration. The patch released in capm3-v1.4.3 addresses the core issue by properly decoupling TLS and authentication mechanisms, ensuring that even in environments where TLS is not enabled, proper authentication remains in place. Organizations should also implement network segmentation and firewall rules to limit direct access to Ironic services, though this represents a secondary mitigation rather than a primary fix for the vulnerability itself.