CVE-2023-53589 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 10/04/2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't trust firmware n_channels
If the firmware sends us a corrupted MCC response with n_channels much larger than the command response can be, we might copy far too much (uninitialized) memory and even crash if the n_channels is large enough to make it run out of the one page allocated for the FW response.
Fix that by checking the lengths. Doing a < comparison would be sufficient, but the firmware should be doing it correctly, so check more strictly.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/27/2026
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2023-53589 resides within the Linux kernel's iwlwifi wireless driver implementation, specifically within the mvm (multi-virtual interface management) subsystem that handles Intel wireless network adapters. This issue represents a classic buffer overflow condition that could potentially lead to system instability and arbitrary code execution. The flaw manifests when the wireless firmware sends a corrupted Mobile Country Code (MCC) response containing an inflated n_channels parameter that exceeds the allocated memory boundaries for firmware command responses.
The technical root cause stems from insufficient input validation within the wireless driver's firmware communication handling code. When processing MCC responses from the firmware, the system fails to properly validate the n_channels field against the actual allocated buffer size. This allows a maliciously crafted firmware response to specify an excessively large channel count value that would cause the driver to attempt copying an amount of uninitialized memory far beyond the allocated one-page buffer. The vulnerability specifically affects the memory management routines that handle firmware command responses, where the driver allocates exactly one page of memory for processing these responses.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple memory corruption to potentially enable system crashes and denial of service conditions. When the n_channels parameter exceeds the buffer boundaries, the driver may attempt to read from uninitialized memory regions or overwrite adjacent memory locations, leading to unpredictable behavior including kernel panics, system hangs, or even potential privilege escalation scenarios. The severity is amplified by the fact that this occurs during normal wireless operation when firmware responses are processed, making it difficult to detect and prevent through conventional security measures.
The fix implemented addresses this vulnerability by introducing stricter length validation checks within the firmware response processing code. Rather than relying on simple less-than comparisons, the patch implements more rigorous validation that ensures the n_channels value remains within acceptable bounds relative to the allocated response buffer. This approach aligns with the principle of defensive programming and follows established security practices for preventing buffer overflow conditions. The mitigation strategy specifically targets the CWE-129 weakness category related to improper validation of array indices, while also addressing elements of CWE-787 which deals with out-of-bounds write operations. The solution demonstrates adherence to the ATT&CK framework's mitigation principles by focusing on input validation and memory safety controls that prevent exploitation of kernel-level vulnerabilities through firmware manipulation.
This vulnerability highlights the critical importance of validating all external inputs in kernel space drivers, particularly those handling firmware communication where the source cannot be fully trusted. The remediation approach emphasizes the need for comprehensive bounds checking and memory management practices that prevent attackers from exploiting seemingly minor parameter validation flaws to achieve significant system compromise. The fix represents a defensive security measure that aligns with industry best practices for kernel security hardening and demonstrates the ongoing need for rigorous validation of firmware interactions within operating system components.