CVE-2023-6917 in pcp
Summary
by MITRE • 02/28/2024
A vulnerability has been identified in the Performance Co-Pilot (PCP) package, stemming from the mixed privilege levels utilized by systemd services associated with PCP. While certain services operate within the confines of limited PCP user/group privileges, others are granted full root privileges. This disparity in privilege levels poses a risk when privileged root processes interact with directories or directory trees owned by unprivileged PCP users. Specifically, this vulnerability may lead to the compromise of PCP user isolation and facilitate local PCP-to-root exploits, particularly through symlink attacks. These vulnerabilities underscore the importance of maintaining robust privilege separation mechanisms within PCP to mitigate the potential for unauthorized privilege escalation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/02/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2023-6917 affects the Performance Co-Pilot (PCP) package, a critical system performance monitoring framework widely used in enterprise environments. This issue manifests through improper privilege management within the systemd service configuration, creating a dangerous inconsistency in access controls that fundamentally undermines the security posture of the monitoring infrastructure. The root cause lies in the mixed privilege model where some PCP services execute under restricted PCP user privileges while others operate with full root access, establishing a clear path for privilege escalation attacks.
The technical flaw represents a classic privilege separation failure that directly maps to CWE-276, which addresses improper privilege management in software systems. When root-privileged processes interact with directories owned by unprivileged PCP users, the system creates opportunities for symlink-based attacks that can be exploited to manipulate file access patterns. This vulnerability specifically enables local attackers to compromise the isolation mechanisms that are essential for maintaining separate user contexts within the PCP framework. The attack vector leverages the fundamental mismatch between service privileges and file ownership, allowing malicious actors to potentially gain root access through carefully crafted symbolic link manipulation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it fundamentally compromises the integrity of the performance monitoring infrastructure. Organizations relying on PCP for system monitoring and analysis face potential exposure to unauthorized access to sensitive system metrics and performance data. The vulnerability enables attackers to bypass the intended security boundaries that separate different user contexts within the PCP environment, potentially allowing them to access or manipulate monitoring data from other users or system components. This represents a significant concern for enterprise environments where performance monitoring data often contains sensitive operational information that could be valuable to adversaries.
From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability aligns with techniques such as T1068 (Local Privilege Escalation) and T1548.001 (Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism), as it exploits improper privilege management to achieve root access. The attack chain typically involves an attacker gaining access to a PCP user account, then leveraging the privilege disparity to create symbolic links that can be exploited by root processes to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing proper privilege separation, ensuring all PCP services operate under consistent user contexts, and implementing strict file access controls that prevent root processes from accessing unprivileged user directories. Additionally, regular security audits of systemd service configurations and privilege models should be conducted to identify and remediate similar issues across the system infrastructure.