CVE-2024-24783 in crypto-x509
Summary
by MITRE • 03/06/2024
Verifying a certificate chain which contains a certificate with an unknown public key algorithm will cause Certificate.Verify to panic. This affects all crypto/tls clients, and servers that set Config.ClientAuth to VerifyClientCertIfGiven or RequireAndVerifyClientCert. The default behavior is for TLS servers to not verify client certificates.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/15/2026
The vulnerability described in CVE-2024-24783 represents a critical panic condition within the Go programming language's crypto/tls package that occurs during certificate chain verification processes. This issue specifically impacts systems that handle TLS communications where certificate validation is performed, creating a potential denial of service scenario that can be exploited by remote attackers. The flaw manifests when the Certificate.Verify function encounters a certificate chain containing a certificate with an unknown public key algorithm, causing the entire verification process to crash rather than gracefully handling the error condition. This behavior affects both TLS clients and servers that are configured to verify client certificates, particularly those with ClientAuth settings set to VerifyClientCertIfGiven or RequireAndVerifyClientCert, while systems using the default configuration that do not verify client certificates remain unaffected.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper error handling within the certificate verification logic of Go's crypto/tls implementation. When processing certificate chains, the system attempts to validate the public key algorithm of each certificate in the chain, but fails to properly handle cases where an unknown or unsupported algorithm is encountered. This leads to a panic condition rather than returning an appropriate error code or continuing processing with appropriate fallback mechanisms. The vulnerability falls under CWE-248, which specifically addresses "Exception Handling and Recovery Issues" and more particularly aligns with CWE-704, "Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast," when considering the type handling during public key algorithm validation. The panic condition occurs because the code path does not properly account for unknown algorithm types during the certificate verification process, leading to an unhandled exception that terminates the application or process.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple denial of service to potentially compromise the stability and availability of TLS-based services across numerous applications and systems. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by presenting a malicious certificate chain containing an unknown public key algorithm to any TLS server or client that performs certificate verification. This attack vector is particularly dangerous because it can be executed against systems that are not directly exposed to the internet but are part of larger network infrastructures. The vulnerability affects systems implementing the tls.Config.ClientAuth parameter settings that require certificate verification, making it a significant concern for enterprise environments that rely on mutual TLS authentication. The panic condition can result in complete service disruption, requiring system restarts and potentially leading to cascading failures in applications that depend on stable TLS connections.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2024-24783 should focus on immediate patching of affected Go versions, as the vulnerability is resolved through proper error handling implementation in the crypto/tls package. Organizations should prioritize updating their Go runtime environments to versions that include the fix, typically those released after the vulnerability disclosure. Additionally, implementing monitoring systems to detect unusual certificate validation patterns can help identify potential exploitation attempts. Network segmentation and access controls should be enhanced to limit exposure to systems that perform client certificate verification, particularly those with the vulnerable ClientAuth configurations. Security teams should also consider implementing certificate validation policies that enforce known public key algorithms and regularly audit certificate chains for potentially malicious or malformed entries. From an ATT&CK perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1071.001, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, as it affects TLS-based communications, and T1499.004, Indirect Command Execution, as the panic condition can be triggered through network-based certificate exchange processes. Organizations should also review their certificate management procedures to ensure that only trusted and properly validated certificates are used in production environments.