CVE-2024-34319 in Law RMS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/13/2026
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the serviceURL parameter of ProPhoenix Law RMS v2022.2403.3.101 allows attackers to force the application server to make unintended DNS and web requests via a crafted HTTP request.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/13/2026
The vulnerability identified as Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, in ProPhoenix Law RMS version 2022.2403.3.101 represents a critical security flaw within the application's handling of user-supplied input for the serviceURL parameter. This type of attack exploits the trust that an application places in its own server to make requests on behalf of users, but without sufficient validation or sanitization of the provided URLs. In this specific instance, the software fails to adequately restrict the destinations that can be accessed via the serviceURL field, allowing external actors to manipulate the parameter into pointing toward internal resources, local services, or arbitrary external domains. The core technical flaw lies in the lack of rigorous input validation and URL scheme enforcement mechanisms within the backend logic processing this specific HTTP request component.
From a technical perspective, SSRF vulnerabilities arise when an application fetches a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. In the context of ProPhoenix Law RMS, the serviceURL parameter is directly utilized by the server to initiate network connections. When an attacker crafts a malicious HTTP request containing a specially constructed value for this parameter, they can direct the server to connect to internal IP addresses that are not accessible from the public internet. This capability effectively bypasses perimeter firewalls and security controls because the traffic originates from within the trusted network zone itself. The vulnerability enables both DNS lookups and web requests, which expands the potential attack surface beyond simple HTTP GET or POST operations to include protocol-level interactions such as FTP, Gopher, or even file:// schemes if not properly restricted by the underlying runtime environment.
The operational impact of this SSRF is significant due to the sensitive nature of a Records Management System (RMS). Law firms and legal departments handle confidential client data, case files, and privileged communications. An attacker leveraging this vulnerability could potentially access internal administrative interfaces, database connection strings stored in configuration files accessible via local file paths, or cloud metadata services that provide instance credentials. By forcing the server to make requests to these internal endpoints, an adversary can map out the internal network topology, identify vulnerable services running on non-standard ports, and extract sensitive information from APIs that are intended for internal use only. This could lead to unauthorized data access, further exploitation of other systems within the private network, or complete compromise of the application server if combined with other vulnerabilities such as remote code execution through specific protocol handlers like Gopher.
This vulnerability aligns closely with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaws where a web server gets a URL provided by a user and makes requests to it without proper validation. Furthermore, in the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to T1571, Non-Standard Port Communication, as attackers may use SSRF to reach services on internal ports that are typically blocked from external access. It also relates to T1046, Network Service Discovery, where the attacker uses the server's network stack to probe for active services within the local environment. The ability to perform DNS lookups additionally facilitates reconnaissance activities categorized under T1598, Phishing for Information, if used in conjunction with other techniques to exfiltrate data through out-of-band channels.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict input validation and output encoding practices at the application layer. Developers should enforce a whitelist approach for allowed URLs or domains rather than relying on blacklist filters which are easily bypassed using obfuscation techniques such as IP address formatting variations, DNS rebinding attacks, or redirect chains. It is essential to disable unnecessary URL schemes like file://, gopher://, and ftp:// within the application's HTTP client configuration. Additionally, network-level controls should be employed, including configuring firewalls to prevent the server from initiating connections to private IP ranges such as 10.x.x.x, 172.16.x.x through 172.31.x.x, and 192.168.x.x, unless absolutely necessary for legitimate business functions. Implementing egress filtering rules that restrict outbound traffic to only known and required external endpoints will significantly reduce the blast radius of this vulnerability. Regular security assessments and code reviews focusing on network interaction patterns are recommended to ensure such flaws do not persist in future updates or related modules within the ProPhoenix Law RMS ecosystem.