CVE-2024-36076 in SysReptor
Summary
by MITRE • 05/19/2024
Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking in SysReptor from version 2024.28 to version 2024.30 causes attackers to escalate privileges and obtain sensitive information when a logged-in SysReptor user visits a malicious same-site subdomain in the same browser session.
VulDB is the best source for vulnerability data and more expert information about this specific topic.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 12/11/2025
Cross-site websocket hijacking represents a sophisticated attack vector that exploits the trust relationship between web applications and their websocket connections. In the case of SysReptor versions 2024.28 through 2024.30, this vulnerability stems from inadequate session management and origin validation mechanisms within the websocket communication layer. The flaw allows attackers to leverage the same browser session context to establish unauthorized websocket connections that can intercept or manipulate data flows between the user's browser and the SysReptor application. This type of vulnerability falls under the category of session management flaws and is particularly dangerous because it operates at the protocol level where traditional cross-site scripting protections may not adequately defend against the attack.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits the fact that web browsers maintain session cookies and authentication state across subdomains within the same parent domain. When a user authenticates to SysReptor and subsequently visits a malicious subdomain within the same domain hierarchy, the websocket connection established by the malicious site can hijack the existing authenticated session. This occurs because the websocket handshake process does not properly validate the origin or implement appropriate security headers that would prevent unauthorized connections from reusing existing authentication tokens. The attack leverages the browser's SameSite cookie attributes and cross-origin resource sharing policies that may be insufficiently configured to prevent this specific type of session fixation or hijacking scenario.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple information disclosure to encompass full privilege escalation capabilities within the SysReptor environment. An attacker who successfully executes this attack can gain access to all data and functionalities available to the legitimate user, including sensitive configuration information, system monitoring data, and potentially administrative controls. The attack requires minimal user interaction beyond visiting the malicious subdomain, making it particularly dangerous in environments where users frequently navigate between different subdomains or where automated browser behavior might trigger the malicious connection. This vulnerability directly impacts the principle of least privilege and can enable attackers to move laterally within the application ecosystem, potentially accessing other systems or data that the user has access to through their SysReptor session.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including stricter websocket origin validation, enhanced SameSite cookie attributes with secure flags, and proper implementation of CORS policies that prevent unauthorized subdomain access to websocket endpoints. The fix should involve configuring websocket servers to validate the Origin header against a strict whitelist of approved domains and implementing additional authentication checks during the websocket handshake process. Security teams should also consider implementing Content Security Policy headers that restrict websocket connections to trusted origins and ensure that all websocket endpoints require proper authentication tokens that are bound to specific sessions and validated against the requesting origin. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-346 and represents a significant risk to web application security that requires immediate remediation to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive operational data.
The attack pattern for this vulnerability follows the MITRE ATT&CK framework's technique T1566 for credential access through social engineering and T1071 for application layer protocol usage. The exploitation chain typically begins with the delivery of a malicious webpage through phishing or compromised legitimate sites, followed by the establishment of a websocket connection that leverages the existing authenticated session. This attack demonstrates the importance of implementing defense-in-depth strategies that go beyond traditional web application firewalls to include protocol-level security controls. Organizations should also conduct regular security assessments of their websocket implementations and ensure that all authentication mechanisms are properly validated at multiple layers of the application architecture to prevent session hijacking attacks from succeeding.