CVE-2024-38751 in Google Adsense & Banner Ads by AdsforWP Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 01/02/2025
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Magazine3 Google Adsense & Banner Ads by AdsforWP allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Google Adsense & Banner Ads by AdsforWP: from n/a through 1.9.28.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/16/2025
This cross-site request forgery vulnerability exists within the Magazine3 Google Adsense & Banner Ads plugin developed by AdsforWP, representing a critical security weakness that undermines the integrity of web applications. The flaw allows malicious actors to exploit the plugin's lack of proper CSRF protection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized actions to be performed on behalf of authenticated users. The vulnerability specifically affects versions ranging from the initial release through 1.9.28, indicating a prolonged period during which the plugin remained susceptible to this type of attack. The issue stems from the absence of anti-CSRF tokens or similar validation mechanisms that would typically be implemented to verify the authenticity of requests originating from legitimate users.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability demonstrates a failure in the plugin's request validation process, where no cryptographic token or unique identifier is required to confirm that a request originates from the intended user interface rather than from a malicious third party. This weakness aligns with CWE-352, which specifically addresses cross-site request forgery vulnerabilities in web applications. Attackers can leverage this flaw by crafting malicious requests that, when executed by an authenticated user, perform unauthorized actions within the plugin's administrative interface. The absence of proper validation allows attackers to manipulate the plugin's functionality without requiring user credentials or explicit authentication.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data manipulation, as it can enable attackers to modify banner advertisements, alter ad settings, or potentially disrupt the entire advertising infrastructure managed by the plugin. This poses significant risks to website administrators who rely on the plugin for revenue generation through Google Adsense integration. The vulnerability particularly affects websites where the plugin is used to manage advertising content, as unauthorized modifications could result in financial losses, compromised ad performance, or even complete disruption of advertising campaigns. Security researchers have identified that this weakness can be exploited through social engineering techniques where users are tricked into visiting malicious websites that automatically submit requests to the vulnerable plugin.
Mitigation strategies for this CSRF vulnerability should focus on implementing robust anti-CSRF token mechanisms within the plugin's administrative interfaces. The recommended approach involves generating unique, unpredictable tokens for each user session and validating these tokens with every state-changing request. This solution aligns with the ATT&CK framework's mitigation strategies for web application attacks, specifically addressing the techniques used in web-based exploitation. Additionally, implementing proper request origin validation and ensuring that all administrative actions require explicit user confirmation through secondary authentication mechanisms would significantly reduce the attack surface. Regular security updates and patch management procedures should be enforced to ensure that users maintain protection against known vulnerabilities, while developers should adopt secure coding practices that incorporate CSRF protection from the initial development phases. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of input validation and the principle of least privilege in web application security, where administrative functions should never be executable without proper authorization tokens or user consent mechanisms.