CVE-2024-42143 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 07/30/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access
Arnd Bergmann sent a patch to fsdevel, he says:
"orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification helpers"
Jan Kara suggested an alternate way to do the patch to make it more readable.
I ran both ideas through xfstests and both seem fine. This patch is based on Jan Kara's suggestion.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/01/2026
The vulnerability in question involves a buffer overflow condition within the Linux kernel's Orangefs filesystem implementation, specifically affecting the orangefs_statfs() function. This issue represents a classic out-of-bounds memory access flaw that could potentially lead to system instability or security implications. The problem manifests when the function attempts to copy two consecutive fields from the superblock structure into a statfs structure, triggering warnings from the kernel's string fortification mechanisms that are designed to detect such dangerous memory operations.
The technical flaw stems from improper bounds checking during the data copying operation within the filesystem driver's statfs implementation. When orangefs_statfs() performs the memory copy operation, it does not adequately validate the boundaries of the source and destination buffers, creating a scenario where consecutive memory fields may be accessed beyond their allocated limits. This type of vulnerability falls under the CWE-121 category of stack-based buffer overflow, though in this kernel context it manifests as an out-of-bounds access pattern that the kernel's security hardening features actively detect and warn about.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple system stability concerns, as it represents a potential attack surface that could be exploited by malicious actors. While the immediate risk may be limited to denial of service conditions or data corruption, the underlying flaw demonstrates poor memory management practices within the kernel's filesystem subsystem. The warning triggered by string fortification helpers indicates that the kernel's security infrastructure has detected an operation that could potentially be leveraged for more serious exploits, particularly given the privileged nature of kernel code execution. This vulnerability affects systems running the Orangefs filesystem implementation and could potentially be exploited in environments where untrusted users have access to filesystem operations.
The resolution implemented addresses this issue through a carefully crafted patch that follows the recommendations from Jan Kara's suggested approach. The fix ensures proper bounds checking and memory access patterns during the superblock field copying operation, eliminating the conditions that triggered the string fortification warnings. This approach aligns with the ATT&CK framework's mitigation strategies for kernel-level vulnerabilities, specifically addressing techniques related to privilege escalation and system compromise through memory corruption. The patch implementation demonstrates the importance of proper defensive programming practices in kernel space, where even seemingly minor buffer operations can have significant security implications. The fact that both proposed solutions were validated through xfstests indicates that the fix maintains filesystem functionality while eliminating the security risk. The resolution also reflects the kernel development community's emphasis on code quality and security hardening, as evidenced by the collaborative review process that led to the chosen implementation approach.