CVE-2024-42364 in homepage
Summary
by MITRE • 08/23/2024
Homepage is a highly customizable homepage with Docker and service API integrations. The default setup of homepage 0.9.1 is vulnerable to DNS rebinding. Homepage is setup without certificate and authentication by default, leaving it to vulnerable to DNS rebinding. In this attack, an attacker will ask a user to visit his/her website. The attacker website will then change the DNS records of their domain from their IP address to the internal IP address of the homepage instance. To tell which IP addresses are valid, we can rebind a subdomain to each IP address we want to check, and see if there is a response. Once potential candidates have been found, the attacker can launch the attack by reading the response of the webserver after the IP address has changed. When the attacker domain is fetched, the response will be from the homepage instance, not the attacker website, because the IP address has been changed. Due to a lack of authentication, a user’s private information such as API keys (fixed after first report) and other private information can then be extracted by the attacker website.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 03/13/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2024-42364 represents a critical DNS rebinding attack vector affecting the Homepage application version 0.9.1. This particular security flaw stems from the application's default configuration that lacks both SSL certificates and authentication mechanisms, creating an exploitable environment where attackers can manipulate DNS resolution to gain unauthorized access to internal network resources. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-200, which deals with information exposure, and specifically relates to improper access control and lack of authentication measures that enable attackers to bypass security controls through DNS manipulation techniques.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability begins with an attacker constructing a malicious website that can dynamically alter DNS records during the attack execution. The attacker first identifies the internal IP address of the vulnerable Homepage instance by creating subdomains that resolve to different internal IP addresses and then monitoring which ones respond to DNS queries. This process, known as DNS rebinding, exploits the fact that browsers maintain DNS cache entries for a certain period, allowing attackers to initially resolve their malicious domain to an external IP address and then quickly change it to point to the internal target. The attack leverages the default insecure configuration where the application does not implement proper authentication or certificate validation, making it possible for attackers to access sensitive information that would normally be protected by network segmentation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe as it allows attackers to extract sensitive data from users' internal systems without requiring any privileged access or complex exploitation techniques. The attack specifically targets the absence of authentication mechanisms in the default Homepage setup, enabling unauthorized access to API keys and other private information stored within the application. This represents a significant risk to organizations that deploy the Homepage application without proper security hardening, as it allows attackers to bypass traditional network security controls and directly access internal resources. The vulnerability affects the principle of least privilege and demonstrates how default insecure configurations can create dangerous attack surfaces that can be exploited with minimal technical expertise.
The mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate security gaps in the application's default configuration and the broader architectural issues that enable DNS rebinding attacks. Organizations should implement mandatory authentication mechanisms and SSL certificates for all instances of the Homepage application, particularly in environments where internal network access might be exposed to untrusted networks. The solution involves configuring proper access controls that prevent unauthorized users from accessing the application's API endpoints and implementing certificate validation to ensure that only trusted connections are established. Additionally, network-level protections such as DNS filtering and monitoring for suspicious DNS resolution patterns can help detect and prevent these types of attacks. This vulnerability highlights the importance of following security best practices and avoiding default configurations that prioritize ease of deployment over security, as outlined in the ATT&CK framework's emphasis on privilege escalation and initial access techniques that exploit insecure configurations.