CVE-2024-47945 in IoT Interface
Summary
by MITRE • 10/15/2024
The devices are vulnerable to session hijacking due to insufficient entropy in its session ID generation algorithm. The session IDs are predictable, with only 32,768 possible values per user, which allows attackers to pre-generate valid session IDs, leading to unauthorized access to user sessions. This is not only due to the use of an (insecure) rand() function call but also because of missing initialization via srand(). As a result only the PIDs are effectively used as seed.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/21/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2024-47945 represents a critical session management flaw that undermines the security of authentication mechanisms across affected devices. This weakness stems from inadequate entropy in the session identifier generation process, creating a predictable cryptographic landscape that directly enables session hijacking attacks. The implementation fails to establish proper randomness foundations, leaving session tokens within a severely constrained namespace of only 32,768 possible values per user account. This mathematical limitation fundamentally compromises the security model by reducing the attack surface from an astronomically large space to a manageable subset that can be systematically exploited through precomputation techniques.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper utilization of pseudorandom number generation functions within the application's session management code. Specifically, the system relies on the insecure rand() function without proper initialization through srand() calls, creating a deterministic sequence based on process identifiers as the sole source of entropy. This design flaw directly maps to CWE-330, which addresses the use of insufficiently random values in security contexts, and demonstrates a clear failure in cryptographic implementation practices. The absence of proper seeding means that session IDs generated across different system instances will exhibit predictable patterns, particularly when the underlying process ID values are known or can be inferred by attackers.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond simple unauthorized access, as it enables sophisticated attack patterns that can compromise multiple user sessions simultaneously. Attackers can pre-generate valid session identifiers and systematically test them against target systems, effectively bypassing traditional authentication mechanisms. This vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1566, which covers credential harvesting through session hijacking, and represents a prime example of how weak randomness can undermine entire security architectures. The limited session space of 32,768 values means that an attacker requires only a modest computational effort to discover valid session tokens, making this attack vector particularly dangerous in environments where multiple users maintain active sessions.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate implementation flaws and establish robust cryptographic foundations for future session management. The primary remediation involves replacing the insecure rand() function with cryptographically secure random number generators such as those provided by the system's cryptographic libraries or dedicated secure random number generation APIs. Proper initialization of random number generators through srand() calls using high-entropy sources including system time, process identifiers, and hardware-based entropy sources is essential. Additionally, organizations should implement session management best practices including session token length expansion beyond the current constrained 32-bit space, regular session rotation policies, and monitoring for suspicious session activity patterns. The implementation should also consider incorporating additional entropy sources such as hardware random number generators or system-level cryptographic services to ensure that session identifiers maintain sufficient entropy to resist prediction attacks and meet industry standards for cryptographic security.