CVE-2024-52583 in WesHacks
Summary
by MITRE • 11/18/2024
The WesHacks GitHub repository provides the official Hackathon competition website source code for the Muweilah Wesgreen Hackathon. The page `schedule.html` before 17 November 2024 or commit 93dfb83 contains links to `Leostop`, a site that hosts a malicious injected JavaScript file that occurs when bootstrap is run as well as jquery. `Leostop` may be a tracking malware and creates 2 JavaScript files, but little else is known about it. The WesHacks website remove all references to `Leostop` as of 17 November 2024.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/26/2025
The vulnerability identified in CVE-2024-52583 represents a significant security risk within the WesHacks GitHub repository that hosted the official website for the Muweilah Wesgreen Hackathon. This issue stems from the inclusion of malicious third-party JavaScript resources within the schedule.html page, which remained active until November 17, 2024, when the repository was updated to remove all references to the problematic domain. The presence of these malicious links demonstrates a critical failure in the security review process for third-party dependencies and external resources, creating an attack surface that could have been exploited by threat actors seeking to compromise users accessing the hackathon website. The vulnerability specifically affects the bootstrap and jquery libraries that were being loaded from the compromised domain, indicating a broader impact on the website's client-side security posture.
The technical flaw manifests through the injection of malicious JavaScript through external resource loading mechanisms that were not properly validated or secured. This type of vulnerability aligns with CWE-829, which addresses the inclusion of untrusted code, and represents a classic example of a supply chain attack where legitimate-looking resources are compromised to deliver malicious payloads. The malicious domain Leostop appears to function as a tracking malware delivery mechanism that creates two separate JavaScript files upon execution, suggesting a multi-stage attack approach that could potentially include data exfiltration capabilities, user tracking, and other malicious activities. The fact that these resources were loaded as part of standard bootstrap and jquery libraries indicates that the vulnerability exploited the trust relationship between the website and its third-party dependencies, making detection and mitigation more challenging.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple website compromise, as it represents a potential vector for user data collection and tracking activities that could affect participants in the hackathon competition. Users accessing the schedule.html page during the vulnerable period would have unknowingly executed malicious JavaScript code that could have collected browser fingerprinting data, tracked user behavior, and potentially established persistent access points through the injected JavaScript files. This vulnerability also demonstrates the importance of continuous security monitoring and the need for automated security scanning of external dependencies, as it allowed malicious code to remain undetected for an extended period. The attack pattern aligns with techniques described in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under the T1583.001 sub-technique for acquiring infrastructure, where threat actors establish domains and services to host malicious payloads that can be seamlessly integrated into legitimate websites.
The remediation process for this vulnerability required immediate removal of all references to the compromised Leostop domain from the website's source code, which was accomplished through the repository update on November 17, 2024. However, the incident highlights the necessity of implementing comprehensive security measures including dependency verification, content security policy enforcement, and regular security audits of third-party resources. Organizations should adopt practices such as using secure content delivery networks, implementing strict external resource policies, and establishing automated scanning processes to detect compromised dependencies. The vulnerability also underscores the importance of maintaining detailed security documentation and incident response procedures that can be activated when malicious resources are detected, ensuring that security teams can quickly identify and remediate similar issues across their infrastructure. This case serves as a reminder of the critical importance of supply chain security and the need for organizations to maintain vigilance against malicious resources that can be seamlessly integrated into legitimate websites through trusted dependencies.