CVE-2024-5764 in Nexus Repository
Summary
by MITRE • 10/23/2024
Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in Sonatype Nexus Repository has been discovered in the code responsible for encrypting any secrets stored in the Nexus Repository configuration database (SMTP or HTTP proxy credentials, user tokens, tokens, among others). The affected versions relied on a static hard-coded encryption passphrase. While it was possible for an administrator to define an alternate encryption passphrase, it could only be done at first boot and not updated.
This issue affects Nexus Repository: from 3.0.0 through 3.72.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/06/2025
The vulnerability CVE-2024-5764 represents a critical use of hard-coded credentials flaw in Sonatype Nexus Repository software that fundamentally undermines the security posture of affected systems. This weakness resides in the encryption mechanism responsible for protecting sensitive configuration data within the Nexus Repository database, including SMTP credentials, HTTP proxy authentication details, user tokens, and various other secrets. The flaw manifests as a static, hardcoded encryption passphrase that is embedded within the software code itself, creating a persistent security risk that affects all versions from 3.0.0 through 3.72.0. The implementation violates fundamental security principles by assuming that the encryption key remains constant throughout the system lifecycle, which creates a single point of failure for all encrypted data stored within the repository.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from a design decision that prioritizes convenience over security, as the system automatically employs a default hard-coded passphrase for all encryption operations without providing mechanisms for dynamic key rotation or updates. This approach directly correlates to CWE-798, which specifically addresses the use of hard-coded credentials in software, and aligns with the broader category of insecure cryptographic implementation patterns. The vulnerability's impact is exacerbated by the fact that while administrators could theoretically define an alternative encryption passphrase during the initial system boot process, this configuration option was permanently locked and could not be modified afterward, effectively creating a permanent backdoor for attackers who might discover the hardcoded credentials. This limitation demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the software's key management architecture that violates industry best practices for cryptographic key lifecycle management.
The operational impact of CVE-2024-5764 extends far beyond simple credential exposure, as it provides attackers with access to all secrets stored within the Nexus Repository configuration database. This access could enable unauthorized users to intercept and decrypt sensitive information including SMTP authentication credentials that might be used to send malicious emails or access email accounts, HTTP proxy credentials that could provide network access to internal systems, and user tokens that could be used to impersonate legitimate users within the repository environment. The vulnerability's persistence across multiple versions means that organizations with older installations are particularly at risk, as they cannot simply upgrade to resolve the issue without implementing additional compensating controls. From an attack perspective, this vulnerability maps directly to ATT&CK technique T1552.001, which involves the use of hardcoded credentials for privilege escalation and lateral movement within affected environments.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should implement immediate mitigations including the deployment of network segmentation controls to limit access to Nexus Repository systems, implementation of monitoring solutions to detect unauthorized access attempts, and the establishment of emergency procedures for credential rotation. The most effective immediate response involves disabling the affected encryption functionality and manually reconfiguring all stored credentials using secure methods, though this approach requires careful planning to avoid disrupting repository operations. Long-term remediation strategies should focus on implementing proper key management infrastructure that supports dynamic key rotation, establishing secure credential storage mechanisms, and conducting comprehensive security assessments of all encrypted data within affected systems. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of adhering to the principle of least privilege and implementing multi-factor authentication for administrative access to critical repository systems. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security controls such as intrusion detection systems and regular security audits to detect potential exploitation attempts. The incident serves as a critical reminder of the importance of avoiding hardcoded credentials in security-critical applications and emphasizes the necessity of implementing robust key management practices that support secure cryptographic operations throughout the software lifecycle.