CVE-2024-7346 in OpenEdge
Summary
by MITRE • 09/03/2024
Host name validation for TLS certificates is bypassed when the installed OpenEdge default certificates are used to perform the TLS handshake for a networked connection. This has been corrected so that default certificates are no longer capable of overriding host name validation and will need to be replaced where full TLS certificate validation is needed for network security. The existing certificates should be replaced with CA-signed certificates from a recognized certificate authority that contain the necessary information to support host name validation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/05/2024
This vulnerability represents a critical weakness in the TLS certificate validation mechanism of OpenEdge applications where the system fails to properly verify host names during secure network connections. The flaw occurs specifically when default certificates are utilized for TLS handshakes, creating a scenario where the certificate validation process can be circumvented without proper security controls. This bypass allows malicious actors to potentially establish connections with unauthorized servers while maintaining the appearance of legitimate secure communication, fundamentally undermining the trust model that TLS is designed to provide.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from improper certificate validation logic within the OpenEdge framework where default certificates are configured to automatically bypass host name validation checks. This design flaw creates a path where the system accepts certificates without verifying that the certificate subject matches the expected host name, which is a fundamental security control in TLS implementations. The vulnerability directly relates to CWE-295 which addresses improper certificate validation and certificate pinning failures, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1046 which involves network service scanning and exploitation of weak authentication mechanisms.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple security concerns to potentially enable man-in-the-middle attacks where attackers can intercept and modify network traffic without detection. When default certificates are used in production environments, legitimate users may unknowingly connect to malicious servers that present valid but unauthorized certificates. This weakness particularly affects organizations that rely on OpenEdge applications for critical business processes, as it creates opportunities for data exfiltration, credential theft, and system compromise through network-based attacks. The vulnerability affects the integrity and confidentiality of all network communications that depend on the default certificate configuration.
Organizations must immediately replace all default certificates with properly signed certificates from recognized certificate authorities that include appropriate subject alternative names and common names to support valid host name validation. Security teams should conduct comprehensive inventory assessments to identify all systems utilizing default certificates and implement certificate management policies that enforce the use of CA-signed certificates with proper validation controls. The remediation process should include replacing existing certificates with those that contain the necessary DNS names and host information required for proper TLS validation, ensuring that all network connections maintain the security guarantees that TLS is designed to provide. This vulnerability underscores the importance of proper certificate lifecycle management and the necessity of implementing robust validation controls that cannot be bypassed through default configuration settings.