CVE-2025-13173 in API Control Plane
Summary
by MITRE • 10/19/2026
Tokens associated with user sessions are not revoked when the corresponding user session is terminated, unless another SSO request is initiated. This occurs when the session-bound token feature is enabled with token binding validation and the "Revoke token upon user logout" option is not active. The software fails to automatically invalidate session-bound tokens upon user session termination.
This vulnerability exists when token binding validation is enabled. As a result, a malicious actor possessing a valid session-bound token could exploit this condition to maintain unauthorized access to applications and resources even after the associated user session has ended, potentially leading to the exposure of sensitive user data.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/19/2026
The described vulnerability represents a critical flaw in identity and access management systems where session-bound tokens are not properly invalidated upon the termination of a user's active session. This issue specifically arises when token binding validation is enabled but the configuration option for revoking tokens upon user logout remains inactive or disabled. In such configurations, the authentication infrastructure fails to execute the necessary cleanup procedures that would otherwise invalidate the cryptographic material associated with the terminated session. Consequently, the token persists in a valid state within the system's trust store or cache, creating a discrepancy between the logical end of the user session and the actual validity period of the issued credentials. This architectural oversight undermines the fundamental security principle that access rights should be strictly tied to active authentication states, allowing for potential persistence mechanisms even after explicit user disconnection.
From an operational perspective, this flaw enables unauthorized actors who have obtained a valid session-bound token through interception or theft to maintain persistent access to applications and sensitive resources long after the legitimate user has logged out. Since the system does not automatically invalidate these tokens upon logout, the attacker can reuse the stolen credential to authenticate as the victim without needing further interaction with the identity provider's login interface. This scenario is particularly dangerous in environments where token binding is used to tie credentials to specific client devices or network locations, as it suggests that even bound tokens may remain usable if the revocation mechanism is misconfigured. The persistence of these valid tokens effectively extends the window of opportunity for attackers to exfiltrate data, perform actions on behalf of the user, and move laterally within the network infrastructure without triggering immediate alerts related to session expiration or invalidation events.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-613, which categorizes insufficient session expiration as a significant security risk, although it is exacerbated here by the specific failure to revoke tokens upon logout rather than just relying on timeout mechanisms. Furthermore, this behavior facilitates post-authentication attacks that can be mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1528 Steal Application Access Token and potentially T1078 Valid Accounts if the attacker leverages the stolen token to impersonate a legitimate user. The lack of automatic revocation means that even robust binding mechanisms are rendered ineffective because the system continues to trust credentials that should have been considered compromised or expired due to session termination. This creates a false sense of security where administrators may believe that logging out is sufficient for securing access, while in reality, the underlying tokens remain active and exploitable until they naturally expire based on their predefined lifetime settings, which could be hours or days depending on configuration.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must ensure that the "Revoke token upon user logout" option is explicitly enabled within the identity provider's configuration settings. This ensures that when a session ends, whether through explicit logout actions or timeout events, all associated tokens are immediately invalidated in the backend systems and caches. Additionally, implementing short-lived access tokens with refresh token rotation can limit the window of exposure if a token is compromised before revocation occurs. Security teams should also audit their authentication flows to verify that logout endpoints trigger comprehensive cleanup procedures including invalidation at both the session level and the token binding validation layer. Regular penetration testing focused on identity management systems can help identify such misconfigurations, ensuring that the lifecycle of credentials strictly adheres to the principle of least privilege and minimal exposure time.