CVE-2025-24331 in Single RAN
Summary
by MITRE • 07/02/2025
The Single RAN baseband OAM service is intended to run as an unprivileged service. However, it initially starts with root privileges and assigns certain capabilities before dropping to an unprivileged level. The capabilities retained from the root period are considered extensive after the privilege drop and, in theory, could potentially allow actions beyond the intended scope of the OAM service. These actions could include gaining root privileges, accessing root-owned files, modifying them as the file owner, and then returning them to root ownership. This issue has been corrected starting from release 24R1-SR 0.2 MP and later.
Beginning with release 24R1-SR 0.2 MP, the OAM service software capabilities are restricted to the minimum necessary.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/02/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2025-24331 affects the Single RAN baseband OAM service which operates within telecommunications infrastructure environments. This service is designed to function as an unprivileged process but exhibits a critical privilege escalation flaw during its initialization sequence. The service begins execution with root privileges and subsequently drops to an unprivileged user account while retaining certain Linux capabilities that exceed what is typically required for legitimate operational functions. This design flaw creates a window of opportunity for potential attackers to exploit the elevated capabilities that persist after the privilege drop. The retained capabilities represent a significant security risk as they could theoretically be leveraged to execute actions that extend far beyond the intended operational scope of the OAM service.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from improper privilege management during service initialization. When the OAM service starts with root privileges, it establishes a baseline of system access that should be immediately restricted to only those capabilities necessary for its legitimate functions. However, the service retains extensive capabilities that include but are not limited to file system access, process manipulation, and potentially root-level operations. This represents a violation of the principle of least privilege and creates a potential attack surface that could be exploited through various vectors including privilege escalation techniques. The vulnerability specifically relates to the Linux capabilities framework where processes retain specific elevated privileges even after dropping root ownership, creating persistent security risks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation to encompass potential system compromise and data integrity violations. An attacker who gains control of the OAM service could potentially access root-owned files, modify them as the file owner, and then restore them to root ownership, effectively bypassing normal access controls and audit mechanisms. This capability could enable unauthorized system modifications, data exfiltration, or the installation of persistent backdoors within telecommunications infrastructure. The implications are particularly severe in network infrastructure environments where such services control critical baseband operations and access to underlying system resources. The vulnerability affects systems running versions prior to 24R1-SR 0.2 MP, making it a critical concern for organizations maintaining legacy deployments.
The remediation implemented in release 24R1-SR 0.2 MP addresses this vulnerability through comprehensive capability restriction measures that align with security best practices and industry standards. The fix ensures that the OAM service operates with only the minimum necessary capabilities required for its legitimate functions, thereby eliminating the excessive privileges that previously created the security risk. This approach directly addresses the underlying design flaw by implementing proper privilege separation and capability management. The solution follows established security principles including the principle of least privilege and privilege separation, which are fundamental concepts in both the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) catalog and MITRE ATT&CK framework. Organizations should prioritize upgrading to the patched release to eliminate this vulnerability and prevent potential exploitation attempts targeting telecommunications infrastructure systems. The mitigation strategy represents a proper implementation of secure coding practices and privilege management that should be considered standard for all system services operating within critical infrastructure environments.