CVE-2025-32878 in PACE 3info

Summary

by MITRE • 06/20/2025

An issue was discovered on COROS PACE 3 devices through 3.0808.0. It implements a function to connect the watch to a WLAN. This function is mainly for downloading firmware files. Before downloading firmware files, the watch requests some information about the firmware via HTTPS from the back-end API. However, the X.509 server certificate within the TLS handshake is not validated by the device. This allows an attacker within an active machine-in-the-middle position, using a TLS proxy and a self-signed certificate, to eavesdrop and manipulate the HTTPS communication. This could be abused, for example, for stealing the API access token of the assigned user account.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 07/08/2025

The COROS PACE 3 device firmware version 3.0808.0 contains a critical security vulnerability that stems from improper TLS certificate validation during firmware update communications. This flaw resides in the device's wireless connectivity implementation which is designed to facilitate firmware downloads through WLAN connections. The vulnerability specifically affects the TLS handshake process where the device fails to validate the X.509 server certificate presented by the backend API server, creating a significant security gap in the communication channel.

The technical implementation of this vulnerability allows for a man-in-the-middle attack scenario where an adversary positioned within the network can intercept and manipulate traffic between the device and the legitimate backend server. Through the use of a TLS proxy with a self-signed certificate, attackers can successfully establish a false TLS connection that appears legitimate to the device. This certificate validation failure falls under CWE-295 which specifically addresses improper certificate validation in TLS implementations. The attack vector is particularly concerning because it requires only network-level access rather than physical device compromise, making it accessible to adversaries with basic network reconnaissance capabilities.

The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple eavesdropping capabilities to include potential credential theft and account compromise. When the device requests firmware information via HTTPS from the backend API, it transmits sensitive user account information including API access tokens that are essential for maintaining user sessions and device authentication. The absence of certificate validation means that attackers can intercept these tokens and potentially gain unauthorized access to user accounts, enabling them to perform actions such as modifying device settings, accessing personal data, or conducting further attacks against the user's account. This vulnerability directly maps to ATT&CK technique T1566 which covers credential harvesting through phishing and social engineering, though in this case the credential theft occurs through network interception rather than user interaction.

The security implications of this vulnerability are particularly severe given that COROS PACE 3 devices are designed for fitness and athletic applications where users may store personal health data, location information, and account credentials. The device's reliance on wireless connectivity for firmware updates creates a persistent attack surface that remains active whenever the device connects to a network. This vulnerability represents a fundamental failure in the device's security architecture, as it undermines the core security promise of encrypted communications. Organizations and individual users should consider immediate mitigation steps including network segmentation, deployment of network monitoring tools to detect anomalous TLS traffic patterns, and potentially disabling automatic firmware update features until a firmware patch is available. The vulnerability highlights the critical importance of certificate validation in embedded systems and mobile devices where network communications are essential for device functionality and user security.

Responsible

MITRE

Reservation

04/11/2025

Disclosure

06/20/2025

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00346

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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