CVE-2025-34501 in Deck Mate 2
Summary
by MITRE • 11/04/2025
Deck Mate 2 is distributed with static, hard-coded credentials for the root shell and web user interface, while multiple management services (SSH, HTTP, Telnet, SMB, X11) are enabled by default. If an attacker can reach these interfaces - most often through local or near-local access such as connecting to the USB or Ethernet ports beneath the table - the built-in credentials permit administrative login and full control of the system. Once authenticated, an attacker can access firmware utilities, modify controller software, and establish persistent compromise. Remote attack paths via network, cellular, or telemetry links may exist in specific configurations but generally require additional capabilities or operator error. The vendor reports that USB access has been disabled in current firmware builds.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/04/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2025-34501 represents a critical security flaw in Deck Mate 2 systems that stems from poor credential management practices and overly permissive default configurations. This device, designed for marine applications, contains hard-coded root credentials that are statically embedded within the system firmware, creating a fundamental weakness that persists across all installations. The presence of these hardcoded credentials violates security best practices and creates a persistent backdoor that remains exploitable regardless of system updates or user authentication changes. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-798 as the use of hard-coded credentials, which is a well-documented weakness that has been exploited in numerous security incidents across various domains.
Multiple network services including SSH, HTTP, Telnet, SMB, and X11 are enabled by default on the Deck Mate 2 system, creating an expanded attack surface that significantly increases the risk of exploitation. This default configuration approach directly conflicts with the principle of least privilege and minimal system exposure, which are core tenets of secure system design. The combination of enabled services with hardcoded credentials creates a particularly dangerous scenario where an attacker requires only basic network access to potentially gain complete system control. The default enabling of multiple protocols also increases the attack surface in accordance with ATT&CK technique T1046 which involves discovering services running on remote systems through network scanning and enumeration.
The attack vector for this vulnerability typically requires local or near-local access through physical connections such as USB or Ethernet ports, which represents a significant operational risk in marine environments where physical access to equipment is often unavoidable. This physical access requirement aligns with ATT&CK technique T1018 which involves discovering systems, hosts, and services on remote networks. However, the presence of hardcoded credentials means that even with physical access, attackers can bypass traditional authentication mechanisms and immediately gain administrative privileges. The system's architecture allows for full administrative control once credentials are successfully used, providing attackers with complete access to firmware utilities and controller software modification capabilities.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple unauthorized access to include potential system compromise and persistent backdoor establishment. Attackers who successfully exploit this vulnerability can modify controller software, access sensitive firmware utilities, and establish persistent compromise that could remain undetected for extended periods. This capability directly relates to ATT&CK technique T1059 which involves executing malicious code through various system interfaces, and T1068 which involves exploiting local system vulnerabilities. The ability to modify controller software and firmware utilities represents a particularly dangerous aspect of this vulnerability, as it could potentially compromise the integrity of critical marine navigation and control systems.
The vendor has acknowledged this issue and reported that USB access has been disabled in current firmware builds, which represents a partial mitigation approach. This response aligns with the principle of defense in depth, where multiple layers of security controls are implemented to reduce the likelihood of successful exploitation. However, the vulnerability's persistence in older firmware versions and the default enabling of other network services means that systems still in operation with outdated firmware remain at risk. The mitigation strategy should include comprehensive firmware updates across all deployed systems, along with network segmentation and access control measures to limit the potential impact of any remaining vulnerabilities. Organizations should also implement regular security assessments and monitoring to detect any unauthorized access attempts to these systems. The vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of proper credential management and default configuration practices, as highlighted in industry standards such as NIST SP 800-53 controls that emphasize the need for secure system configuration and credential protection.