CVE-2025-46730 in Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF
Summary
by MITRE • 05/05/2025
MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Typically, MobSF is deployed on centralized internal or cloud-based servers that also host other security tools and web applications. Access to the MobSF web interface is often granted to internal security teams, audit teams, and external vendors. MobSF provides a feature that allows users to upload ZIP files for static analysis. Upon upload, these ZIP files are automatically extracted and stored within the MobSF directory. However, in versions up to and including 4.3.2, this functionality lacks a check on the total uncompressed size of the ZIP file, making it vulnerable to a ZIP of Death (zip bomb) attack. Due to the absence of safeguards against oversized extractions, an attacker can craft a specially prepared ZIP file that is small in compressed form but expands to a massive size upon extraction. Exploiting this, an attacker can exhaust the server's disk space, leading to a complete denial of service (DoS) not just for MobSF, but also for any other applications or websites hosted on the same server. This vulnerability can lead to complete server disruption in an organization which can affect other internal portals and tools too (which are hosted on the same server). If some organization has created their customized cloud based mobile security tool using MobSF core then an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to crash their servers. Commit 6987a946485a795f4fd38cebdb4860b368a1995d fixes this issue. As an additional mitigation, it is recommended to implement a safeguard that checks the total uncompressed size of any uploaded ZIP file before extraction. If the estimated uncompressed size exceeds a safe threshold (e.g., 100 MB), MobSF should reject the file and notify the user.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/03/2025
CVE-2025-46730 represents a critical denial of service vulnerability within MobSF, a widely used mobile application security testing platform that operates on centralized server infrastructures hosting multiple security tools and web applications. This vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of ZIP file extraction processes, specifically lacking checks on uncompressed file sizes during the static analysis upload feature. The flaw exists in versions up to and including 4.3.2 where the system automatically extracts uploaded ZIP files without verifying their potential uncompressed size, creating an exploitable condition that aligns with the well-documented ZIP bomb attack pattern. The vulnerability manifests when attackers craft malicious ZIP archives that appear small in compressed form but expand to enormous sizes upon extraction, directly correlating to attack techniques categorized under the MITRE ATT&CK framework as privilege escalation and denial of service through resource exhaustion. The technical implementation flaw resides in the absence of size validation mechanisms within the file extraction pipeline, which should be classified as a CWE-400 vulnerability related to unchecked resource consumption in the context of file processing operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond the immediate disruption of MobSF functionality, as it can compromise the entire server infrastructure hosting multiple applications and services. When an attacker successfully executes a ZIP bomb attack against the vulnerable MobSF instance, the server's disk space becomes exhausted, leading to cascading failures that affect other internal portals, security tools, and web applications sharing the same server environment. This represents a significant risk for organizations that have integrated MobSF as a core component of their cloud-based mobile security solutions, where the exploitation could result in complete service outages and potential business disruption. The vulnerability's severity is amplified by the fact that the affected system typically operates in privileged environments where internal security teams, audit personnel, and external vendors maintain access, providing multiple potential attack vectors for exploitation. The lack of size restrictions during extraction creates a direct path to resource exhaustion that aligns with common attack patterns identified in industry threat intelligence reports, where adversaries leverage file processing vulnerabilities to achieve persistent system disruption.
The mitigation strategy for this vulnerability requires implementing comprehensive size validation mechanisms that check the total uncompressed size of uploaded ZIP files before any extraction occurs. The recommended safeguard involves establishing a predetermined threshold, such as 100 MB for uncompressed content, beyond which the system should automatically reject the file and provide appropriate user feedback. This approach directly addresses the root cause of the vulnerability by preventing the execution of potentially malicious extraction operations that could overwhelm server resources. The fix implemented in commit 6987a946485a795f4fd38cebdb4860b368a1995d demonstrates the proper approach to addressing such vulnerabilities through proactive input validation and resource consumption monitoring. Organizations should also consider implementing additional protective measures including automated monitoring of disk space utilization, setting up alerts for unusual file processing activities, and establishing proper network segmentation to isolate critical security tools from other applications. These defensive strategies align with security best practices outlined in industry standards and help ensure that similar vulnerabilities do not compromise the broader organizational infrastructure that relies on the same server resources.