CVE-2025-51643 in T366G-L GPS Tracker
Summary
by MITRE • 08/28/2025
Meitrack T366G-L GPS Tracker devices contain an SPI flash chip (Winbond 25Q64JVSIQ) that is accessible without authentication or tamper protection. An attacker with physical access to the device can use a standard SPI programmer to extract the firmware using flashrom. This results in exposure of sensitive configuration data such as APN credentials, backend server information, and network parameter
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/28/2025
The Meitrack T366G-L GPS tracker represents a significant security vulnerability through its unprotected SPI flash memory implementation. This device utilizes a Winbond 25Q64JVSIQ chip that lacks proper authentication mechanisms or tamper protection measures, creating an exploitable weakness in the device's security architecture. The vulnerability stems from the absence of hardware-level protections that would normally prevent unauthorized access to the device's internal storage, leaving critical operational data exposed to physical attackers who possess access to the hardware itself. The design flaw allows for direct extraction of firmware and configuration information without requiring any authentication credentials or cryptographic verification.
The technical exploitation of this vulnerability occurs through standard SPI programming interfaces that are accessible to attackers with physical possession of the device. Attackers can utilize common tools like flashrom to read the contents of the Winbond 25Q64JVSIQ flash chip, which contains not only the device firmware but also sensitive operational parameters embedded within the system. This exposure creates a comprehensive data leak scenario where attackers gain access to APN credentials that enable network connectivity, backend server addresses that provide access points for further attacks, and network parameters that reveal the device's communication infrastructure. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-310, which addresses cryptographic weaknesses and the lack of proper authentication mechanisms in embedded systems.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data exposure to create potential pathways for broader network compromise and device manipulation. When attackers obtain the APN credentials, they can establish unauthorized network connections that may allow for remote command execution or data exfiltration. Backend server information provides attackers with targets for further reconnaissance and potential exploitation of the communication infrastructure. Network parameters reveal the device's communication patterns and protocols, enabling attackers to craft more sophisticated attacks against the device or its associated network ecosystem. This vulnerability particularly affects IoT security posture by demonstrating how embedded devices can expose critical infrastructure information through physical access.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require both hardware and software level interventions to protect the SPI flash memory from unauthorized access. Device manufacturers should implement physical tamper detection mechanisms that prevent access to the SPI interface, along with cryptographic authentication requirements that validate access to the flash memory. The implementation of secure boot mechanisms and encrypted storage would prevent attackers from extracting usable firmware or configuration data even if they gain physical access. Organizations should also consider implementing device attestation protocols that can detect unauthorized firmware modifications and alert administrators to potential security breaches. This vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of applying the principle of least privilege even to embedded system components and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1547.001, which covers registry run keys and startup folder techniques that can be leveraged through compromised device configurations.