CVE-2025-52883 in Meshtastic
Summary
by MITRE • 06/25/2025
Meshtastic-Android is an Android application for the mesh radio software Meshtastic. Prior to version 2.5.21, an attacker is able to send an unencrypted direct message to a victim impersonating any other node of the mesh. This message will be displayed in the same chat that the victim normally communicates with the other node and it will appear as using PKC, while it is not. This means that the victim will be provided with a false sense of security due to the green padlock displayed when using PKC and they'll read the attacker's message as legitimate. Version 2.5.21 contains a patch for the issue. It is suggested to implement a stricter control on whether a message has been received using PKC or using the shared Meshtastic channel key. Moreover, instead of showing no green padlock icon in the chat with no PKC, consider using an explicit indicator like, for example, the yellow half-open padlock displayed when in HAM mode. This remediation, however, applies to the client applications rather than the Meshtastic firmware.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/25/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-52883 affects the Meshtastic-Android application, which serves as a critical communication interface for mesh radio networks. This security flaw exists in versions prior to 2.5.21 and represents a sophisticated impersonation attack vector that undermines the fundamental security assumptions of the mesh communication system. The vulnerability specifically targets the message authentication and encryption verification mechanisms within the Android client, creating a scenario where malicious actors can exploit the system's trust model to deliver deceptive communications.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of encryption status during message processing. When an attacker sends an unencrypted direct message to a victim, the application incorrectly displays this message within the normal chat interface that would typically be used for PKC-encrypted communications. The system fails to properly distinguish between messages that have actually been encrypted using PKC versus those transmitted through the shared channel key, resulting in the display of a green padlock icon that falsely indicates end-to-end encryption. This misrepresentation occurs because the application does not enforce strict cryptographic verification protocols before rendering messages in the chat interface, allowing unencrypted content to appear as if it were properly secured.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple misinformation, as it fundamentally compromises the security posture of mesh network communications. Users who rely on the visual security indicators provided by the application may be misled into believing their communications are protected when they are not, creating a false sense of security that could be exploited for social engineering attacks or information gathering. The vulnerability affects the core trust model of the mesh network, where users expect that messages displayed with encryption indicators have actually been secured through proper cryptographic means. This flaw particularly impacts the integrity of communications between nodes that would normally use PKC, as attackers can insert false messages that appear legitimate to recipients who are not technically aware of the encryption status discrepancy.
The remediation approach for this vulnerability focuses on strengthening client-side validation mechanisms and improving user interface indicators to provide clearer cryptographic status information. Version 2.5.21 implements stricter controls to verify whether messages have been received using PKC or through the shared channel key, addressing the root cause of the impersonation capability. The suggested enhancement involves implementing explicit visual indicators that distinguish between different encryption states, such as using a yellow half-open padlock for HAM mode communications rather than displaying no padlock at all. This approach aligns with security best practices for user interface design and follows the principle of least privilege by ensuring that users receive accurate feedback about their communication security status. The remediation strategy addresses the client-side application behavior rather than the firmware, indicating that the vulnerability primarily resides in the Android application's message processing logic and user interface rendering rather than in the core mesh networking protocols or hardware implementations.
This vulnerability demonstrates the importance of proper cryptographic verification and user interface design in secure communication systems. It relates to CWE-310, which covers cryptographic issues, and could potentially be leveraged as part of broader attack vectors in the ATT&CK framework under the privilege escalation and defense evasion categories. The flaw exemplifies how seemingly minor interface inconsistencies can create significant security implications in environments where users rely on visual security indicators for trust assessment. The vulnerability highlights the need for comprehensive security testing of client applications, particularly those handling sensitive communications, and underscores the importance of maintaining cryptographic integrity throughout the entire communication pipeline from message generation to display.