CVE-2025-59823 in gardener-extension-provider-aws
Summary
by MITRE • 09/25/2025
Project Gardener implements the automated management and operation of Kubernetes clusters as a service. Code injection may be possible in Gardener Extensions for AWS providers prior to version 1.64.0, Azure providers prior to version 1.55.0, OpenStack providers prior to version 1.49.0, and GCP providers prior to version 1.46.0. This vulnerability could allow a user with administrative privileges for a Gardener project to obtain control over the seed cluster where the shoot cluster is managed. This affects all Gardener installations where Terraformer is used/can be enabled for infrastructure provisioning with any of the affected components. This issue has been patched in Gardener Extensions for AWS providers version 1.64.0, Azure providers version 1.55.0, OpenStack providers version 1.49.0, and GCP providers version 1.46.0.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/29/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-59823 represents a critical code injection flaw within Project Gardener's extension components for cloud provider integrations. This security weakness specifically impacts the automated management and operation of Kubernetes clusters as a service, creating a significant risk for organizations relying on Gardener's infrastructure provisioning capabilities. The vulnerability exists in multiple provider extensions including AWS, Azure, OpenStack, and GCP components, each with distinct affected versions that highlight the widespread nature of this flaw across different cloud environments. The security implications extend beyond simple code execution, as the vulnerability allows privilege escalation from administrative access within a Gardener project to full control over the underlying seed cluster where shoot clusters are managed.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization within the Terraformer integration components used by Gardener for infrastructure provisioning. When administrative users interact with Gardener's extension components, maliciously crafted inputs can be processed and executed within the context of the seed cluster's operations, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary code into the system. This flaw operates at the intersection of configuration management and infrastructure automation, where user-provided parameters intended for cloud resource provisioning are not properly sanitized before being passed to underlying Terraform operations. The vulnerability aligns with CWE-94, which describes improper control of generation of code, and specifically manifests as a code injection weakness that can be exploited through the extension provider interfaces. The attack vector is particularly dangerous because it leverages the legitimate administrative privileges of users within Gardener projects, making detection more challenging and exploitation more effective.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends far beyond individual cluster compromises, potentially affecting entire seed cluster operations and the broader cloud infrastructure managed by Gardener. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability gains the ability to manipulate the underlying infrastructure provisioning processes, potentially leading to unauthorized resource creation, data exfiltration, or complete system compromise. The vulnerability affects all Gardener installations that utilize Terraformer for infrastructure provisioning, making it particularly concerning for large-scale deployments where multiple projects and clusters are managed through a single seed cluster. This represents a significant risk to cloud security posture, as the seed cluster serves as the operational hub for managing multiple shoot clusters, and compromise of this component can lead to cascading failures across the entire managed infrastructure. The attack surface is further expanded by the fact that any administrative user within a Gardener project can potentially exploit this vulnerability, creating an insider threat scenario that traditional perimeter-based security measures cannot adequately address.
Organizations must implement immediate remediation strategies to address this vulnerability across all affected components, beginning with the mandatory upgrade of Gardener Extensions to their patched versions. The mitigation approach should include comprehensive security assessments of existing installations to identify any potential exploitation attempts, along with the implementation of network segmentation and access controls to limit administrative privileges within Gardener projects. Security teams should also establish monitoring protocols specifically designed to detect anomalous behavior in Terraformer operations and infrastructure provisioning activities. The vulnerability's resolution requires coordinated patching across multiple provider extensions, making proper change management and testing procedures essential for successful remediation. Organizations should also consider implementing additional security controls such as privileged access management systems and automated security scanning of infrastructure-as-code templates to prevent similar issues from arising in the future. This vulnerability demonstrates the critical importance of secure input handling in automation tools and highlights the need for robust security practices in cloud-native infrastructure management systems, particularly those operating at the intersection of user privilege management and infrastructure provisioning.