CVE-2025-63729 in SY-GPON-1110-WDONT
Summary
by MITRE • 11/25/2025
An issue was discovered in Syrotech SY-GPON-1110-WDONT SYRO_3.7L_3.1.02-240517 allowing attackers to exctract the SSL Private Key, CA Certificate, SSL Certificate, and Client Certificates in .pem format in firmware in etc folder.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/25/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-63729 represents a critical configuration flaw in the Syrotech SY-GPON-1110-WDONT device running firmware version SYRO_3.7L_3.1.02-240517. This issue stems from improper access controls and insecure storage practices that allow unauthorized parties to extract sensitive cryptographic materials directly from the device's file system. The vulnerability exists within the device's firmware implementation where certificate files are stored in plain text format within the etc directory without adequate protection mechanisms. This configuration exposes the device to potential exploitation by attackers who can gain access to the complete SSL/TLS cryptographic infrastructure.
The technical flaw manifests as a lack of proper file system permissions and encryption controls that should normally protect sensitive certificate files. The vulnerability enables attackers to extract the SSL private key, CA certificate, SSL certificate, and client certificates all in .pem format, which represents a complete cryptographic compromise of the device's security posture. The .pem format is particularly concerning as it is a standard format for storing X.509 certificates and private keys in a readable ASCII format, making the extracted materials immediately usable for malicious purposes. This flaw directly violates security best practices outlined in the CWE-310 standard for cryptographic issues and represents a failure in proper key management and secure storage implementation.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted. Once attackers obtain the extracted certificates and private keys, they can perform man-in-the-middle attacks, impersonate legitimate devices, and decrypt sensitive communications that were previously protected by the device's SSL/TLS infrastructure. The compromise of client certificates specifically enables attackers to authenticate as authorized users, potentially gaining access to restricted network resources and services. This vulnerability affects the fundamental security model of the device and can lead to complete network compromise if the device serves as a gateway or intermediate point in network communications. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this as a privilege escalation and credential access technique, specifically mapping to T1552.001 for unsecured credentials and T1046 for network service scanning.
The security implications extend beyond immediate exploitation to long-term network compromise and data breaches. The exposed private keys can be used to generate valid certificates for other devices, enabling widespread impersonation attacks across the network. Organizations relying on this device for network infrastructure may experience complete loss of confidentiality and integrity for communications passing through the compromised device. The vulnerability also creates opportunities for lateral movement within networks, as attackers can use the extracted certificates to establish trust relationships with other network components. Proper mitigation requires immediate firmware updates, certificate revocation, and comprehensive network monitoring to detect any unauthorized use of the compromised cryptographic materials. The vulnerability highlights the critical importance of secure firmware development practices and proper implementation of access controls as outlined in NIST SP 800-144 and ISO/IEC 27001 standards for information security management.