CVE-2026-0159 in Android
Summary
by MITRE • 09/15/2026
In Cellular Modem, there is a possible out-of-bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/15/2026
The identified vulnerability represents a critical security flaw within the cellular modem firmware or software stack, characterized by an out-of-bounds write condition resulting from insufficient input validation and missing bounds checking mechanisms. In modern mobile devices, the cellular modem operates as a semi-autonomous subsystem that handles complex protocol stacks for network communication, including LTE, 5G NR, and legacy GSM standards. These modems often process large volumes of data packets received over the air interface, parsing headers and payload structures to extract control commands or user data. When the software fails to verify that an index, length field, or pointer offset remains within the allocated memory boundaries before performing a write operation, it allows for arbitrary memory corruption. This specific flaw is particularly dangerous because cellular modems are frequently exposed to untrusted input directly from network base stations, which can be spoofed by malicious actors using specialized hardware such as software-defined radios located in close proximity to the target device.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, potentially leading to remote code execution with no additional privileges required for exploitation. Since cellular modems typically run at a high privilege level relative to other components on the system-on-chip or possess direct access to critical hardware resources, achieving arbitrary write primitives often translates directly into full control over the modem processor. This can allow an attacker to bypass security boundaries that separate the baseband processor from the application processor in many device architectures. By exploiting this out-of-bounds write, a threat actor could inject malicious code into the modem firmware or memory space, effectively turning the cellular radio into a persistent backdoor. The absence of user interaction requirements means that exploitation can be automated and triggered simply by connecting to a compromised cell tower or using a rogue base station simulation tool, making it feasible for state-sponsored actors or sophisticated criminal enterprises to target devices in bulk without social engineering efforts.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write, which describes the act of writing data past the end or before the beginning of an intended buffer. This is often a consequence of improper boundary checks during array indexing or pointer arithmetic operations within C or C++ based firmware codebases common in embedded systems. Furthermore, the exploitation vector relates to ATT&CK technique T1572: Protocol Tunneling, where attackers establish communication channels with compromised infrastructure using non-standard protocols or by exploiting trusted services like cellular networks to evade detection. The lack of user interaction places this under initial access vectors that do not rely on human error, increasing the risk profile significantly compared to vulnerabilities requiring phishing or physical access.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Manufacturers should immediately issue firmware updates that patch the specific memory management routines responsible for parsing cellular protocol messages, ensuring strict bounds checking is implemented before any write operations occur on buffers derived from network input. Static analysis tools configured to detect buffer overflow patterns and dynamic fuzzing of modem interfaces are essential for identifying similar flaws in other parts of the codebase. Additionally, implementing hardware-enforced isolation mechanisms such as TrustZone or secure enclaves can limit the blast radius if an exploit is successful by preventing the compromised modem from directly accessing sensitive application memory. Network operators should also consider deploying intrusion detection systems capable of identifying anomalous signaling patterns indicative of rogue base station attacks, providing a secondary layer of defense against exploitation attempts in the wild.