CVE-2026-100610 in Flowise
Summary
by MITRE • 09/26/2026
Flowise through 3.1.4 exposes GET /api/v1/upsert-history/:id and PATCH /api/v1/upsert-history without route-level permission checks, and the backing service performs no workspace or ownership validation. getAllUpsertHistory() returns UpsertHistory rows selected solely by an attacker-supplied chatflowid, and patchDeleteUpsertHistory() deletes rows by an attacker-supplied array of record UUIDs. As a result, any authenticated low-privilege user or valid API key can read or delete document-store upsert history belonging to other users and other workspaces whenever the target chatflowId (which is exposed publicly in /chatbot/<chatflowId> share links) or row ids are known. The retrievable flowData and result fields contain embedding, record-manager and vector-store node configuration, including per-node paramValues. No patched version is available.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/26/2026
The vulnerability identified in Flowise versions prior to 3.1.4 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms within the application's API layer. Specifically, the endpoints GET /api/v1/upsert-history/:id and PATCH /api/v1/upsert-history lack route-level permission checks, allowing any authenticated user or valid API key to interact with upsert history data without proper authorization validation. This architectural flaw is compounded by the backing service performing no workspace or ownership verification when processing requests. Consequently, an attacker who possesses a low-privilege account or a valid API key can read or delete document-store upsert history records belonging to other users and different workspaces, provided they know the target chatflowId or row identifiers. This situation creates a severe risk of unauthorized data access and potential denial of service through malicious deletion operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the sensitive nature of the data exposed by these endpoints. The getAllUpsertHistory() function returns UpsertHistory rows selected solely based on an attacker-supplied chatflowid, while patchDeleteUpsertHistory() allows for the deletion of records via an array of record UUIDs supplied by the requester. Since chatflowIds are often publicly accessible through /chatbot/<chatflowId> share links, attackers can easily enumerate valid targets. The retrieved data includes flowData and result fields which contain detailed configuration information for embedding, record-manager, and vector-store nodes. This includes per-node paramValues that may reveal internal system configurations, API keys used by the application to connect with external services such as database providers or AI model endpoints, and other sensitive infrastructure details. Such exposure facilitates further attacks including credential theft, lateral movement within the organization's network, and manipulation of machine learning models if the vector store is compromised.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-284 Improper Access Control, as it involves unauthorized access to restricted resources due to insufficient enforcement of security policies at the API level. It also relates to CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (Open Redirect) in terms of how public endpoints can be leveraged for enumeration, though primarily it is an authorization bypass issue. In the context of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this behavior corresponds to T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object and potentially T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact if deletion leads to significant operational disruption. The lack of workspace isolation means that multi-tenant environments are particularly vulnerable, as data intended to be siloed by tenant is instead accessible across boundaries based on predictable identifiers.
Mitigation strategies must address both the immediate exposure and the underlying architectural weaknesses. Since no patched version is currently available for Flowise versions below 3.1.4, administrators should implement compensating controls at the network or reverse proxy level to restrict access to these specific API endpoints. This can be achieved by configuring web application firewalls to block requests that do not originate from trusted internal sources if external access is not required, or by enforcing strict IP whitelisting for administrative functions. Additionally, developers must ensure that all API routes implement robust authorization checks that verify the requesting user's permissions against the resource being accessed, specifically validating workspace ownership and role-based access rights before processing any read or write operations on upsert history data. Until a patch is released, limiting public sharing of chatflows to only those necessary for business functions can reduce the attack surface by minimizing the number of discoverable chatflowIds available to potential attackers.