CVE-2026-101295 in Assisted Installer for OpenShift Container Platform
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
Path traversal / arbitrary file write in oc-mirror's operator catalog image extraction. When mirroring operator catalogs using either the legacy v1 path (--v1) or the OCI feature path (--use-oci-feature), oc-mirror extracts tar entries from catalog image layers without validating that file paths resolve within the intended destination directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The vulnerability identified in the oc-mirror tool represents a critical security flaw rooted in improper input validation during archive extraction processes, specifically classified under CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. This weakness allows an attacker with control over the content of operator catalog images to execute arbitrary file writes on the host system where the mirroring operation is performed. The core technical failure lies in the lack of path canonicalization and validation before extracting tar entries from container image layers, regardless of whether the legacy v1 protocol or the newer OCI feature path is utilized by the tool.
When oc-mirror processes operator catalogs, it extracts various files including manifests, metadata, and bundle contents from compressed archive formats embedded within the container images. The extraction mechanism fails to verify that each file entry's destination path resolves strictly within the intended target directory structure. This omission creates a classic path traversal scenario where maliciously crafted tar archives can contain entries with relative paths such as ../../etc/passwd or absolute paths pointing outside the sandboxed mirror workspace. By exploiting this flaw, an attacker can overwrite critical system files, inject malicious scripts into executable directories, or corrupt configuration files essential for cluster operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to its potential for remote code execution and privilege escalation if the mirroring process runs with elevated privileges, which is common in CI/CD pipelines managing Kubernetes clusters. An adversary could manipulate the mirrored operator catalog to include a malicious bundle that writes backdoors or reverse shells into system directories like /usr/local/bin or /etc/cron.d. This compromises not only the integrity of the local file system but also the security posture of the entire Kubernetes cluster, as compromised operators may be deployed with heightened permissions leading to broader lateral movement and data exfiltration capabilities aligned with MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter or T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict path validation at the extraction layer within oc-mirror itself, ensuring that all file paths are canonicalized and checked against a whitelist of allowed directories before any write operations occur. Additionally, users should employ least-privilege principles by running mirroring processes in isolated environments or containers with restricted filesystem access to limit the blast radius of potential exploitation. Upgrading to patched versions of oc-mirror where this validation is implemented correctly is essential for maintaining supply chain security during cluster upgrades and operator installations.