CVE-2026-102129 in Kiteworks
Summary
by MITRE • 10/01/2026
A user-provisioning interface in Kiteworks Core did not verify that the requesting administrator was entitled to grant the role being assigned. An administrator whose delegated permissions covered role changes alone could therefore raise an account to full system-administrator privileges.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/01/2026
The vulnerability identified within Kiteworks Core represents a critical failure in access control logic, specifically manifesting as a broken function level authorization flaw. This issue arises from the application's user-provisioning interface failing to perform adequate verification of the requesting administrator's entitlements before processing role assignment requests. In secure systems, privilege escalation must be strictly gated by verifying that the actor possesses not only general administrative capabilities but also specific permissions for the target action. Here, the system allows an operator with delegated permissions limited solely to modifying user roles to escalate their own privileges to full system-administrator status without requiring additional authentication or authorization checks for this elevated state change.
From a technical perspective, the core defect lies in the server-side validation logic governing role assignments. When an administrator initiates a request to assign a new role to any account, including themselves, the application fails to cross-reference the current permission scope of that administrator against the requirements of the target role. Instead of enforcing a principle where high-privilege actions require explicit, granular approval or higher-level credentials, the system trusts the administrative context implicitly for all role modifications regardless of severity. This lack of granularity in access control allows an attacker to bypass intended security boundaries by exploiting the trust relationship between the administrator interface and the underlying privilege management subsystems.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it effectively neutralizes the principle of least privilege within the administrative framework. An adversary who gains initial access with a low-privilege admin account or exploits another minor flaw to obtain such credentials can immediately escalate their rights to full system administrator level. This complete compromise of administrative integrity allows for unrestricted data exfiltration, modification of security configurations, installation of persistent backdoors, and potential lateral movement within the broader network infrastructure protected by Kiteworks Core. The ability to self-escalate means that even if initial access is limited or monitored, the attacker can quickly elevate their status to evade detection mechanisms designed for lower-level users.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-269, which classifies Improper Privilege Management, specifically highlighting cases where an actor obtains privileges they are not authorized to have. Furthermore, in terms of offensive security frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, this behavior corresponds directly to the T1078 Valid Accounts technique, particularly when combined with privilege escalation tactics that allow attackers to maintain persistence and expand their control over critical assets. The failure to validate permissions for specific high-value actions is a common pattern in enterprise applications where role-based access control models are implemented without sufficient granularity or validation at each step of the workflow.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict authorization checks within the user-provisioning module. Developers should ensure that any request to assign administrative roles, particularly full system-administrator privileges, requires verification against a comprehensive list of allowed permissions for the requesting actor. This includes enforcing multi-factor authentication or secondary approval workflows for privilege escalation events. Additionally, conducting a thorough audit of all delegated permission sets is essential to identify and restrict overly broad role definitions that could facilitate similar escalations in other parts of the application. Regular penetration testing focused on access control logic will help detect such flaws before they can be exploited in production environments.