CVE-2026-102145 in Kiteworks
Summary
by MITRE • 10/01/2026
An authenticated administrator could cause the server to issue requests to, and interact with, internal network services that are not meant to be reachable through this interface. On its own this did not result in code execution.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/01/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) flaw affecting an administrative interface within the application architecture. This specific class of weakness allows an authenticated user, specifically one with administrator privileges, to manipulate the server into making HTTP or other network requests to destinations that are typically restricted from external access. The core technical issue lies in the insufficient validation and sanitization of input parameters provided by the administrator during their interaction with the service. Instead of restricting these interactions solely to intended internal endpoints for legitimate administrative functions, the application fails to enforce strict allow-listing or robust deny-listing mechanisms against arbitrary hostnames, IP addresses, or protocols. Consequently, an attacker leveraging this flaw can direct the server's outbound traffic toward internal network services that are not designed to be reachable through this particular interface, effectively bypassing perimeter security controls and network segmentation strategies intended to isolate critical backend systems from unauthorized access vectors.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) ID 918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery as enabling an attacker to cause the server-side application to make requests to arbitrary URLs or internal resources. The severity of this flaw is significantly amplified by the requirement for authentication and administrative privileges. While SSRF vulnerabilities are often found in unauthenticated contexts where any user can exploit them, requiring admin access narrows the attack surface but increases the potential impact per successful exploitation event. An administrator typically possesses broader permissions within the application logic, meaning that if they choose to abuse this functionality, they may be able to trigger actions or retrieve data from internal services with higher trust levels than those available to standard users. The fact that direct code execution does not occur on its own indicates that the vulnerability is primarily a mechanism for reconnaissance and lateral movement rather than an immediate remote code execution vector. However, it serves as a critical stepping stone in advanced persistent threat scenarios where initial access has already been established through privilege escalation or credential compromise.
The operational impact of this vulnerability centers on information disclosure and potential service disruption within the internal network infrastructure. By forcing the server to interact with internal services, an attacker can probe for open ports, identify running versions of backend applications, extract sensitive configuration data, or even trigger unintended actions in microservices that rely on implicit trust relationships based on source IP addresses. Many modern distributed systems assume that requests originating from within the same network segment are safe and do not require additional authentication checks. An SSRF exploit can bypass these assumptions by making it appear as though the request is coming directly from the server itself, rather than an external client. This capability allows for detailed mapping of the internal network topology, identification of vulnerable legacy systems that may lack modern security controls, and potential interaction with cloud metadata services if deployed in a cloud environment, which could lead to further credential theft. Although code execution is not immediate, the ability to interact with these restricted services creates significant risk for data exfiltration and system compromise through secondary exploitation paths.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must implement strict input validation on all parameters that influence server-side network requests. This includes enforcing a whitelist approach where only explicitly defined internal endpoints are permitted, rather than relying on blacklists which can be easily bypassed using encoding techniques or alternative IP representations such as hexadecimal or DNS rebinding attacks. Additionally, implementing network-level controls is crucial; firewalls and security groups should restrict outbound traffic from the application server to only those ports and protocols necessary for its function, blocking access to internal management interfaces and metadata services by default. Application-layer defenses can also be employed, such as disabling unnecessary HTTP methods or enforcing strict content-type checks on responses returned from internal services. Regular penetration testing focused on SSRF scenarios is recommended to identify similar flaws in other parts of the application that may handle user-supplied URLs or hostnames. Furthermore, ensuring that administrative interfaces are protected by multi-factor authentication and monitored for anomalous outbound traffic patterns can help detect exploitation attempts early before significant damage occurs.