CVE-2026-102637 in Fusion
Summary
by MITRE • 10/27/2026
A maliciously crafted HTML payload in the documentName parameter of a Fusion protocol URL, when the protocol URL is invoked by a user, can trigger a Reflected Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Autodesk Fusion desktop application. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to read local files or execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/27/2026
The identified security flaw resides within the Autodesk Fusion desktop application, specifically affecting how it processes URLs utilizing the proprietary Fusion protocol. This vulnerability is classified as a Reflected Cross-site Scripting (XSS) issue, which stems from insufficient input validation and sanitization mechanisms applied to the documentName parameter embedded within the URL structure. When an end-user interacts with a maliciously crafted link that invokes this specific protocol handler, the application fails to adequately escape or neutralize special characters present in the user-supplied data before rendering it into the execution context of the desktop environment. This lack of proper encoding allows arbitrary script code to be injected directly into the active session, bypassing standard browser-like security boundaries that typically mitigate such attacks in web-based contexts.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability exploits the trust relationship between the operating system and the application when handling custom protocol handlers. Unlike traditional web browsers which operate within strict sandboxed environments with robust Content Security Policies, desktop applications often have broader access to local resources. By reflecting unsanitized input through the documentName parameter, an attacker can inject JavaScript or other executable payloads that run with the privileges of the currently logged-in user. This mechanism effectively transforms a standard hyperlink into a vector for code execution, leveraging the application's elevated permissions relative to typical web contexts. The reflection aspect indicates that the malicious payload is not stored on any server but is instead immediately executed upon invocation by the victim, making it highly effective in phishing scenarios where social engineering tactics are used to entice users into clicking compromised links.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the potential for arbitrary code execution and local file access within the context of the current process. An attacker who successfully exploits this flaw can read sensitive files stored on the victim's machine, potentially exfiltrating proprietary design data, configuration files, or personal information depending on the application's permissions. Furthermore, the ability to execute arbitrary code means that an adversary could install malware, establish persistence mechanisms, or pivot further into a corporate network if the desktop environment is part of a larger infrastructure. This represents a significant risk to both individual users and organizations relying on Autodesk Fusion for critical engineering workflows, as it undermines the integrity and confidentiality of data processed by the application.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-79, which describes Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation known as Cross-site Scripting, specifically in contexts where desktop applications mimic web-like behaviors or utilize embedded rendering engines. Additionally, from a tactical standpoint, this exploitation technique corresponds to ATT&CK techniques related to Client-side Execution and potentially Command and Control via custom protocols. The attack vector relies on user interaction, classifying it under Initial Access vectors that require the victim to perform an action such as clicking a link. To mitigate these risks, Autodesk should implement strict input validation for all parameters passed through protocol handlers, ensuring that only expected alphanumeric characters are accepted while rejecting or encoding any potentially executable content. Furthermore, applying Content Security Policy principles within the desktop application's rendering engine and restricting file system access to necessary directories can significantly reduce the blast radius of such exploits. Users should be advised to exercise caution when interacting with links from untrusted sources, particularly those invoking custom protocols associated with sensitive applications.