CVE-2026-104725 in Groundhogg Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 10/10/2026
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.9 This is due to a missing ownership and capability check on the `user` parameter within the `process_edit()` function, which allows any authenticated user with the `edit_contacts` capability to reassign a contact record's linked WordPress user ID to any arbitrary account without requiring the `edit_users` or `promote_users` capabilities. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with sales_rep-level access and above, to escalate their privileges to administrator by linking a contact to an administrator's WordPress user ID, then creating a note containing the `{auto_login_link}` replacement tag to trigger generation of a valid auto-login permissions-key URL for the administrator-linked contact, and finally visiting that URL to authenticate as the targeted administrator. The auto-login URL is stored in the note content and is readable back by the attacker via the `view_notes` and `add_notes` capabilities that the sales_rep role holds by default.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/10/2026
The Groundhogg plugin, a comprehensive solution for customer relationship management, newsletter distribution, and marketing automation within WordPress environments, has been identified with a critical privilege escalation vulnerability affecting all versions up to 4.9 inclusive. This security flaw stems from an insufficient validation of user ownership and capability checks specifically within the process_edit function when handling the user parameter associated with contact records. The core technical deficiency lies in the application's failure to verify whether the authenticated actor possesses the necessary administrative privileges, such as edit_users or promote_users, before allowing modifications that link a contact record to a specific WordPress user account. Consequently, any authenticated user holding at least the sales_rep role and its default capabilities can manipulate these associations without restriction. This architectural oversight enables attackers with lower-level access to bypass standard permission boundaries by reassigning a contact's linked WordPress user ID to an arbitrary target account, effectively decoupling identity verification from privilege enforcement during data modification operations.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it facilitates a direct path for authenticated users to escalate their privileges to the highest level of access within the WordPress installation: administrator status. The exploitation chain begins with the attacker identifying or creating a contact record and linking it to an existing administrative user account through the vulnerable process_edit function. Once this linkage is established, the attacker utilizes the view_notes and add_notes capabilities, which are inherent to the sales_rep role by default, to insert a specific replacement tag into a note associated with that contact. This tag triggers the generation of a valid auto-login permissions-key URL designed for administrative access. Because the note content remains accessible to users with viewing privileges, the attacker can retrieve this generated URL and subsequently visit it to authenticate directly as the targeted administrator. This sequence effectively circumvents traditional authentication mechanisms and role-based access controls, granting full control over the WordPress environment including the ability to install plugins, modify themes, execute database queries, and potentially compromise underlying server infrastructure if further exploitation vectors exist within the admin interface.
From a classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-269, which denotes Improper Privilege Management, specifically highlighting the failure to enforce proper authorization checks during state-changing operations. The ability of an authenticated user to elevate their privileges without adequate verification corresponds closely to CWE-732 in contexts where default roles provide excessive permissions that can be leveraged for lateral movement or privilege escalation within the application logic. Furthermore, this attack pattern maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, Valid Accounts, as it involves the misuse of legitimate credentials and capabilities inherent to a lower-privileged role to gain unauthorized higher-level access. The specific method of using auto-login links also reflects aspects of session manipulation or token abuse found in techniques related to credential harvesting and privilege escalation within web applications.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Administrators should immediately update the Groundhogg plugin to a version later than 4.9 where this vulnerability has been patched by the developers, ensuring that proper capability checks are enforced before allowing user ID reassignments on contact records. In environments where updating is not instantly feasible, temporary mitigations include restricting access to the affected endpoints via web application firewall rules or modifying WordPress role capabilities to remove view_notes and add_notes permissions from sales_rep users if such granular control is supported by other plugins or custom code. Additionally, implementing strict input validation on all user-related parameters in API calls and ensuring that auto-login mechanisms are tied strictly to verified administrative actions rather than accessible note content can reduce the attack surface. Regular security audits focusing on privilege escalation vectors within CRM modules are essential to maintain integrity, particularly when integrating third-party plugins into critical business infrastructure.