CVE-2026-105034 in NestJS auth service
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
The EnergizeLab Eilik NestJS auth service issues device tokens for arbitrary robot serial numbers without authentication. An unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain a valid device token for any serial number and act as that device against the cloud services.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in the EnergizeLab Eilik NestJS authentication service represents a critical failure in identity verification mechanisms, specifically classified under CWE-287: Improper Authentication. This flaw allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass security controls entirely by requesting and obtaining valid device tokens for arbitrary robot serial numbers. In modern IoT architectures, device tokens serve as the primary credential for establishing trust between edge devices and cloud backends. By issuing these credentials without requiring any form of proof of identity or possession, the service effectively nullifies the authentication layer, transforming a secure channel into an open conduit for unauthorized access.
From a technical perspective, the root cause lies in the API endpoint responsible for token generation failing to validate the requester's legitimacy against the serial number being requested. Typically, such endpoints require either pre-shared keys, certificate-based mutual TLS, or some form of out-of-band verification to ensure that only authorized entities can claim ownership of specific hardware identifiers. The absence of these checks means that any actor with network connectivity to the service endpoint can submit a POST request containing any valid serial number format and receive a signed JWT or similar token in return. This lack of binding between the requester's identity and the target device identifier constitutes a severe logic error in the security design, allowing for complete impersonation capabilities without prior compromise of physical devices or extraction of secrets from existing systems.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is profound, as it enables an attacker to assume full control over any Eilik robot by spoofing its digital identity. Once possessing a valid device token, the attacker can interact with cloud services exactly as the legitimate owner would, potentially accessing user data, modifying device configurations, or issuing commands that alter the physical behavior of the robot. This aligns closely with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, where adversaries leverage existing system credentials to maintain persistence and move laterally within a network environment. Furthermore, because IoT devices often serve as gateways for broader home networks, compromising these endpoints could facilitate further attacks such as lateral movement or data exfiltration from connected smart home ecosystems.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing robust authentication protocols that verify the requester's authority before issuing tokens. This includes enforcing mutual TLS (mTLS) where both client and server authenticate each other using digital certificates tied to specific hardware identities, ensuring that only devices with valid, pre-provisioned certificates can request access. Additionally, integrating challenge-response mechanisms or requiring out-of-band verification steps during initial device provisioning can prevent unauthorized token generation. Immediate remediation should involve patching the NestJS service to enforce strict identity validation checks on all authentication endpoints and auditing existing logs for signs of exploitation where arbitrary serial numbers were used to generate tokens.