CVE-2026-107040 in OMN-Go
Summary
by MITRE • 10/29/2026
Insecure permissions in MBasov OMN-Go versionCode 26080824 allows unauthorized attackers to invoke an exported component, leading to arbitrary data access and control of data flow.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/29/2026
The vulnerability identified within MBasov OMN-Go version code 26080824 represents a critical misconfiguration in the application's security posture, specifically concerning Android permission models and component exportation strategies. This flaw stems from an insecure permissions configuration where exported components are not adequately restricted by appropriate signature-level or normal permissions. In the context of mobile operating systems like Android, exporting a component such as an activity, service, broadcast receiver, or content provider makes it accessible to other applications installed on the same device unless strict permission checks are enforced. When these protections are absent or incorrectly implemented, any application with minimal privileges can interact directly with the exported interface, bypassing intended security boundaries and internal logic controls designed by the developers.
From a technical perspective, this misconfiguration allows unauthorized attackers to invoke components that were meant for internal use only or restricted to trusted entities. By exploiting these exposed endpoints, an attacker can trigger specific functionalities within the application without proper authentication or authorization checks. This capability facilitates arbitrary data access, meaning sensitive information stored locally by the application, such as user credentials, session tokens, personal identifiable information, or proprietary business logic states, can be read and exfiltrated. Furthermore, control over data flow implies that attackers may not only retrieve static data but also manipulate dynamic processes, potentially injecting malicious payloads into legitimate workflows or altering system behavior to achieve unintended outcomes.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it effectively neutralizes the sandboxing mechanisms intended to isolate applications from one another on mobile devices. An attacker leveraging this flaw can compromise user privacy by harvesting sensitive data and undermine application integrity by manipulating its core functions. This could lead to account takeover scenarios if authentication tokens are accessible, or financial fraud if payment-related components are exposed. Additionally, because Android allows third-party apps to query exported content providers or send broadcasts to receivers without explicit permission grants in many default configurations, the attack surface is broad and easily exploitable by malware distributed through unofficial channels or even legitimate but maliciously configured applications seeking privilege escalation.
To mitigate this risk, developers must rigorously audit all component declarations within the AndroidManifest.xml file. Each exported activity, service, receiver, and provider should be evaluated for necessity; if a component does not need to interact with external apps, it should have android:exported set to false. For components that require inter-app communication, strict permission enforcement is mandatory using either signature-level permissions shared only between the app and trusted partners or normal/custom permissions that require explicit user approval during installation. Implementing these controls ensures that only authorized entities can invoke specific functionalities, thereby restoring the principle of least privilege. Regular static analysis scanning for insecure export configurations and dynamic testing to verify access control mechanisms are essential steps in maintaining a secure mobile application lifecycle aligned with industry best practices such as OWASP Mobile Top 10 guidelines regarding insufficient transport layer protection and client-side enforcement failures.