CVE-2026-108047 in ALO Suite
Summary
by MITRE • 11/03/2026
Inadequate authorization vulnerability in Alosuite’s user invitation functionality. The ‘/Requests/userInvitation’ endpoint does not properly validate the assignment of privileges on the server, allowing an attacker to manipulate the invitation parameters during the request process. By intercepting and modifying a legitimate invitation request, an unauthenticated attacker can assign administrative privileges to a newly invited user without the appropriate authorization checks. A successful exploit results in unauthorized privilege escalation, granting full administrative access to the affected application.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/03/2026
The vulnerability identified within Alosuite represents a critical failure in server-side access control mechanisms, specifically manifesting as an Insecure Direct Object Reference or Broken Access Control issue within the user invitation subsystem. The core technical flaw resides in the /Requests/userInvitation endpoint, which processes requests to create new user accounts and assign them specific roles or permissions. During normal operation, this endpoint is designed to accept parameters defining the privileges of a newly invited user, such as standard user, editor, or administrator. However, the application fails to perform adequate authorization checks on the server side before processing these privilege assignments. This means that while legitimate users may be restricted from assigning administrative roles through the graphical interface due to client-side restrictions or role-based access controls enforced by other parts of the system, the underlying API endpoint does not independently verify whether the requesting user possesses the necessary permissions to make such a modification.
This architectural oversight allows an unauthenticated attacker to exploit the vulnerability through parameter manipulation. By intercepting network traffic using tools like Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP, an attacker can capture a legitimate invitation request intended for creating a standard user account. The attacker then modifies the payload of this HTTP request, specifically altering parameters related to role assignment or privilege levels from a low-privilege value to that of an administrator. Because the server does not validate these changes against the current session's permissions or enforce strict policy checks on the input data before execution, it accepts the modified request and proceeds with creating the new user account with elevated privileges. This bypasses all intended security boundaries, effectively allowing privilege escalation from a non-existent or low-privilege state to full administrative control over the application.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it grants an attacker complete administrative access to the Alosuite environment without requiring valid credentials for an existing high-privileged account. With administrative privileges, an attacker can perform any action available to a system administrator, including modifying configuration settings, accessing sensitive data stored within the application, creating backdoor accounts, and potentially executing commands if further vulnerabilities exist in the underlying infrastructure. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the entire system. The ability to create arbitrary admin accounts also facilitates persistent access, as attackers can maintain their foothold even if initial entry points are patched or detected. Furthermore, this vulnerability undermines trust in the application's security model, potentially leading to regulatory non-compliance depending on the nature of data processed by Alosuite.
From a classification perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management and CWE-862: Missing Authorization. In terms of attack vectors, it corresponds to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078: Valid Accounts, specifically the sub-technique of creating new accounts for persistence or privilege escalation. The exploitation relies on client-side trust assumptions where developers incorrectly assume that restricting actions in the user interface is sufficient to prevent unauthorized operations via API manipulation.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation efforts should focus on implementing robust server-side authorization checks within the /Requests/userInvitation endpoint logic. Developers must ensure that every request involving privilege assignment verifies that the authenticated session (if applicable) or the context initiating the request has explicit permission to assign administrative roles. This involves integrating role-based access control (RBAC) policies directly into the business logic of the API, ensuring that privilege levels are validated against a secure server-side registry rather than trusting client-supplied values. Additionally, implementing strict input validation and using allowlists for acceptable privilege levels can prevent arbitrary value injection. It is also recommended to enforce principle of least privilege across all system components and conduct regular security code reviews focusing on access control logic in API endpoints.