CVE-2026-109176 in MoguBlog
Summary
by MITRE • 10/12/2026
MoguBlog through 6.2 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability that allows authenticated administrators to delete other administrators' files via POST /networkDisk/deleteFile and batchDeleteFile. Attackers can supply another administrator's file or folder uid, which NetworkDiskServiceImpl.deleteFile never checks against admin_uid, removing stored objects from local storage, Qiniu or MinIO.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/12/2026
The vulnerability identified in MoguBlog versions through 6.2 represents a critical failure in access control mechanisms, specifically categorized as an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). This flaw resides within the administrative functionality of the application's network disk module, which is designed to manage file storage across local filesystems and cloud providers such as Qiniu or MinIO. The core technical deficiency lies in the implementation of the deleteFile and batchDeleteFile endpoints accessed via POST requests. When an authenticated administrator initiates a deletion request by providing a specific file or folder unique identifier (uid), the backend service NetworkDiskServiceImpl.deleteFile fails to perform any validation to ensure that the resource being deleted belongs to the currently authenticated user. The system does not cross-reference the provided uid against the admin_uid associated with the active session, thereby allowing an attacker who has obtained valid administrative credentials for one account to arbitrarily target and delete files belonging to other administrators within the same instance.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability exploits the assumption that authentication alone is sufficient for authorization in stateful web applications. The application correctly verifies that the user is logged in as an administrator but neglects to enforce object-level ownership checks before executing destructive operations on storage backends. This lack of server-side validation means that any valid administrative session can manipulate resources outside its designated scope simply by altering parameters in HTTP requests, such as changing the uid field to point to a different administrator's data. The impact is severe because it allows for unauthorized deletion of critical system files or user-generated content stored on local storage or integrated cloud services like Qiniu and MinIO. This not only leads to potential data loss but also compromises the integrity and availability of the blogging platform, as essential assets can be removed without authorization from other privileged users who share administrative privileges.
In terms of industry standards, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-639, which describes Insecure Direct Object References where a web application exposes a reference to an internal implementation object such as a file or directory and allows direct manipulation by end-users. Furthermore, the exploitation technique maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK tactic TA0005, specifically under Defense Evasion techniques like T1222 (File and Directory Permissions Modification) if permissions are altered prior to deletion, or more accurately to data destruction aspects within persistence or impact categories depending on intent. The attack vector is classified as remote with low complexity since it requires only authenticated access and basic knowledge of the API structure, making it a high-risk issue for any multi-administrator deployment environment where trust boundaries between admin accounts are not strictly enforced at the application logic layer.
To mitigate this vulnerability, developers must implement strict object-level authorization checks within the NetworkDiskServiceImpl.deleteFile method. This involves retrieving the owner identifier associated with the target file or folder uid from the database and comparing it against the authenticated user's ID before proceeding with any deletion operation on local storage or cloud APIs like Qiniu and MinIO. If the identifiers do not match, the system should reject the request with an appropriate error code indicating insufficient permissions rather than executing the delete command. Additionally, implementing comprehensive audit logging for all file management operations can aid in detecting unauthorized access attempts post-exploitation. Regular security testing using automated tools that simulate IDOR attacks and manual penetration testing focused on privilege escalation and horizontal privilege abuse are recommended to ensure such logic flaws do not persist in future releases of the MoguBlog platform.