CVE-2026-110868 in Renovate
Summary
by MITRE • 10/15/2026
Renovate before 44.79.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows users to make the shared HTTP client request arbitrary internal URLs via extends presets or customDatasources. Attackers can point a preset at an instance metadata service endpoint to obtain AWS credentials or leak sensitive information through Renovate logs.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/15/2026
The identified vulnerability in Renovate versions prior to 44.79.0 represents a critical server-side request forgery flaw that compromises the integrity of automated dependency management workflows. This security issue stems from insufficient validation and sanitization mechanisms within the shared HTTP client used by the application. Specifically, when processing configuration inputs such as extends presets or custom datasources, Renovate fails to adequately restrict the destination URLs requested through these parameters. This architectural oversight allows an attacker who has control over the configuration source to direct internal network requests toward arbitrary endpoints that are otherwise inaccessible from external networks. The vulnerability effectively transforms a standard dependency update tool into a vector for lateral movement and data exfiltration within private infrastructure environments.
The operational impact of this flaw is severe, particularly in cloud-native deployments where instance metadata services provide temporary security credentials. By pointing an extends preset or custom datasource configuration at the AWS Instance Metadata Service endpoint, typically located at 169.254.169.254, a malicious actor can trigger Renovate to fetch sensitive data from within the host environment. This action results in the retrieval of IAM role credentials and other instance-specific metadata without authentication or network restrictions. Furthermore, because these requests are processed by the application server, any leaked information may be inadvertently exposed through standard logging mechanisms if error handling or response processing is not strictly configured to mask such details. Consequently, this vulnerability can lead to full compromise of cloud infrastructure permissions, allowing attackers to escalate privileges and access sensitive data stores associated with the compromised instance.
From a classification perspective, this flaw aligns closely with CWE-918, which defines Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The specific mechanism involves manipulating server-side input parameters to bypass internal security controls that restrict outbound connections. In terms of adversary tactics, this vulnerability facilitates techniques associated with the MITRE ATT&CK framework, particularly T1552.004 for Unsecured Credentials via Cloud Instance Metadata API and potentially T1078 for Valid Accounts if the retrieved credentials are used to authenticate further into internal systems. The exploitation path relies on the trust relationship between the application configuration system and the underlying infrastructure network topology, highlighting a common risk in tools that automate interactions with external resources based on user-provided configurations.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations must immediately upgrade Renovate to version 44.79.0 or later, where these input validation checks have been strengthened. In environments where upgrading is not immediately feasible, strict network-level controls should be implemented to block outbound HTTP requests from the host running Renovate to known internal metadata service IP ranges such as 169.254.169.254 for AWS or equivalent endpoints in other cloud providers like Azure and GCP. Additionally, security teams should audit existing configuration files to ensure that no external sources are being used for presets or datasources unless they are from fully trusted and verified origins. Implementing a whitelist approach for allowed outbound destinations within the application firewall can further reduce the attack surface by preventing unauthorized internal requests regardless of the input provided through the user interface or API.