CVE-2026-111356 in MacCMS
Summary
by MITRE • 10/16/2026
MacCMS v10 through 2026.1000.4056 does not limit attempts on the six-digit password recovery code, allowing unauthenticated attackers to take over member accounts. Attackers knowing a victim's email or phone can request a code and brute-force findpass_reset to overwrite the member's password.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in MacCMS versions 10 through 2026.1000.4056 represents a critical authentication bypass mechanism rooted in insufficient rate limiting on the password recovery functionality. Specifically, the application fails to enforce any constraints or throttling mechanisms on requests for six-digit numeric verification codes used during account restoration processes. This architectural oversight allows an unauthenticated attacker to repeatedly request these codes without encountering temporary blocks, IP-based restrictions, or CAPTCHA challenges that are standard in secure implementations of identity management systems. The absence of such controls transforms a legitimate administrative feature into a vector for automated credential stuffing and brute-force attacks against user accounts.
From a technical perspective, the flaw resides within the findpass_reset endpoint logic which processes password reset requests based on provided email or phone number inputs. Because there is no limit on the number of attempts to guess the six-digit code, an attacker can programmatically iterate through all one million possible combinations (000000-999999) with high probability of success within a reasonable timeframe given sufficient computational resources and network bandwidth. The system validates each submitted code against the most recently generated token for that specific user account without checking if previous attempts were made in rapid succession or from suspicious sources. This lack of stateful validation regarding request frequency enables persistent probing until the correct code is discovered, at which point the attacker gains full control over the associated member profile by setting a new password.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it directly compromises account integrity and user privacy for all registered members on the platform. An adversary who possesses knowledge of a victim's email address or mobile phone number can initiate the recovery process and subsequently brute-force the verification code to overwrite the existing credentials. This leads to unauthorized access where attackers may steal sensitive personal data, manipulate content authored by legitimate users, post malicious material under trusted identities, or use compromised accounts for further phishing campaigns against other community members. In environments where user trust is paramount, such as e-commerce platforms or social networks built on MacCMS, this weakness undermines the fundamental security model of identity verification and can result in significant reputational damage and regulatory non-compliance regarding data protection standards like GDPR or CCPA due to unauthorized access to personally identifiable information.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-307 Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, which describes flaws where an application does not adequately limit the number of failed login attempts, thereby facilitating brute-force attacks. Furthermore, it maps to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1110 Brute Force, specifically subtechniques involving password guessing or credential stuffing via automated tools. The exploitation path relies on the attacker's ability to enumerate valid accounts by triggering recovery emails and then systematically testing codes until access is granted, exploiting the weak entropy of six-digit numeric PINs combined with the lack of temporal constraints on verification attempts.
To mitigate this risk, immediate remediation steps should focus on implementing robust rate limiting policies for all password reset endpoints. Developers must enforce strict limits on the number of code requests allowed per user identity within a defined time window, such as capping requests to three or five per hour. Additionally, integrating CAPTCHA challenges like reCAPTCHA v3 after each failed attempt can significantly increase the cost and difficulty of automated brute-forcing without severely impacting legitimate user experience. It is also advisable to extend the length of verification codes from six digits to eight alphanumeric characters to exponentially increase the search space for attackers. Implementing account lockout mechanisms that temporarily suspend password reset functionality after a certain number of consecutive failures, coupled with monitoring systems that detect anomalous request patterns and alert administrators, will further harden the authentication flow against such exploitation attempts.