CVE-2026-112337 in Wazuh
Summary
by MITRE • 11/06/2026
Wazuh from 3.7.0 before 4.14.9 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the Azure wodle get_graph_events() function that follows @odata.nextLink without host or HTTPS validation. Attackers who influence the nextLink value can redirect manager requests to attacker-controlled endpoints, capturing the reused Microsoft Graph bearer token and reaching internal services.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/06/2026
The identified security flaw resides within the Wazuh agent-manager architecture, specifically affecting versions ranging from 3.7.0 up to but not including version 4.14.9. This vulnerability is classified as a Server-Side Request Forgery, commonly referred to by its CWE identifier CWE-918. The root cause lies in the Azure wodle module's get_graph_events() function, which interacts with Microsoft Graph APIs to retrieve security and audit events for centralized monitoring purposes. Under normal operational conditions, this component processes pagination links provided by the API response to fetch subsequent batches of data efficiently. However, the implementation fails to perform adequate validation on these dynamically generated nextLink values before initiating new HTTP requests.
The technical mechanism of exploitation hinges on the lack of host and protocol verification when following @odata.nextLink parameters returned by Microsoft Graph. An attacker who can influence or manipulate this parameter value is able to redirect the Wazuh manager's outbound network connections away from legitimate Microsoft endpoints toward infrastructure controlled by the adversary. This redirection occurs because the application blindly trusts the URL structure provided in the API response without enforcing strict allowlists for destination hosts or requiring secure transport protocols such as HTTPS. Consequently, any request made during this pagination process can be intercepted and processed by an external server under attacker control rather than remaining within the trusted Microsoft ecosystem.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the sensitive nature of the data being transmitted. When the Wazuh manager redirects its requests to an attacker-controlled endpoint, it inadvertently transmits authentication credentials associated with that request context. Specifically, the reused Microsoft Graph bearer token is included in the headers of these forged requests. This allows the adversary to capture valid session tokens that can be replayed to access sensitive organizational data stored within Azure and Microsoft 365 environments. Furthermore, by controlling the destination of these internal service calls, an attacker may attempt to reach other internal network services or exfiltrate configuration details, effectively bypassing perimeter defenses since the traffic appears as legitimate outbound communication from a trusted management server.
From a threat intelligence perspective, this vulnerability aligns with ATT&CK technique T1598, which covers Phishing for Information Retrieval and specifically relates to Active Scanning where an attacker probes internal resources using compromised credentials or forged requests. The exploitation path demonstrates how misconfigured API integrations can lead to credential theft and lateral movement opportunities within cloud-native environments. Organizations running affected versions of Wazuh must prioritize immediate remediation by upgrading to version 4.14.9 or later, which includes the necessary input validation fixes for the Azure wodle module. In addition to patching, administrators should review network egress policies to restrict outbound connections from management servers to only known and required endpoints, thereby mitigating the risk of successful SSRF exploitation even if similar vulnerabilities are discovered in future updates.