CVE-2026-113404 in WebITR
Summary
by MITRE • 10/20/2026
WebITR developed by Uniong has a Insecure Deserialization vulnerability. Authenticated remote attackers can use the hard-coded cryptographic key to craft and submit malicious serialized data, thereby executing arbitrary code on the server.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/20/2026
The security flaw identified in WebITR, a web-based intrusion detection system developed by Uniong, represents a critical failure in input validation and secure coding practices. This vulnerability is classified as an insecure deserialization issue, which falls under CWE-502 in the Common Weakness Enumeration standard. Insecure deserialization occurs when untrusted data is used to abuse the logic of an application, potentially leading to remote code execution, denial of service, or privilege escalation. The specific manifestation of this flaw within WebITR stems from the system's handling of serialized objects during authentication and session management processes. When a user submits credentials or interacts with certain administrative functions, the backend server attempts to deserialize these inputs into executable object structures. Because the application fails to properly validate the integrity or type of the incoming data before processing it, attackers can exploit this trust relationship to inject malicious payloads.
The operational mechanism of this vulnerability relies heavily on the presence of a hard-coded cryptographic key within the WebITR software binary. In secure systems, keys used for signing or encrypting serialized objects should be dynamically generated, stored in secure hardware modules like HSMs, or at least kept secret and rotated regularly. However, Uniong has embedded a static key directly into the application codebase. This hard-coded nature means that any authenticated attacker who can reverse-engineer the binary or intercept initial legitimate traffic can easily extract this key. With knowledge of this key, an attacker gains the ability to cryptographically sign their own malicious serialized data structures. The server, trusting signatures made with its known internal key, will accept and process these forged objects without raising alarms. This effectively bypasses any integrity checks that might otherwise prevent tampering with session tokens or configuration parameters.
The impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the potential for arbitrary code execution on the underlying operating system hosting WebITR. By crafting a serialized payload containing malicious gadget chains, an authenticated attacker can trigger specific methods within Java libraries commonly used in such environments, leading to command injection via standard classes like Runtime.exec or ProcessBuilder. This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter, as the attacker gains the ability to execute system commands directly on the server. Since WebITR typically runs with elevated privileges to monitor network traffic and manage security policies, successful exploitation could grant the attacker full control over the host machine. This allows for further lateral movement within the protected network, exfiltration of sensitive logs or configuration data, and complete compromise of the organization's defensive posture. The requirement for authentication does not mitigate this risk significantly in many enterprise environments where insider threats exist or credentials may be compromised through phishing or other means.
To mitigate this vulnerability, Uniong must immediately release a patch that removes the hard-coded cryptographic key and implements dynamic key management practices. Furthermore, the application logic should be refactored to avoid deserializing untrusted data entirely. If serialization is necessary for performance reasons, it should be replaced with safer formats like JSON or XML with strict schema validation. Implementing allow-lists for class types during deserialization can also prevent gadget chain exploitation by ensuring only expected classes are instantiated. Organizations currently running vulnerable versions of WebITR should restrict access to the administrative interface using strong multi-factor authentication and network segmentation to limit exposure. Additionally, deploying web application firewalls with rules capable of detecting anomalous serialized data patterns may provide a temporary layer of defense until patches can be applied. Regular security audits and static code analysis tools configured to detect insecure deserialization patterns are recommended for future development cycles to prevent similar flaws from being introduced into the software supply chain.